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FAIR USE AND ITS GLOBAL PARADIGM
EVOLUTION
Peter K Yu*
This Article closely examines the transplant of the fair use model in
US. copyright law on to foreign soil. It begins by reviewing the literature
concerning paradigm shift, in particular Thomas Kuhn's seminal work. The
Article then documents a growing trend toward the worldwide adoption of
the U.S. fair use model and a countertrend toward the retention ofthe status
quo. The juxtaposition ofthese two trends explain why jurisdictions that set
out to transplant U.S. -style fair use ended up adopting a hybrid model. The
second half of this Article interrogates the different primary causes behind
such a paradigm evolution. While many possible factors exist within and
outside the legal system, the discussion focuses on those relating to intel-
lectual property law, international and comparative law, and the legislative
process. The Article concludes with recommendations concerning future ef-
forts to broaden copyright limitations and exceptions in the United States
and across the world. Specifically, it outlines six courses ofaction that seek
to improve these reform efforts. It further identifies three modalities of evo-
lution that can help tailor the transplantedfair use paradigm to local needs,
interests, conditions, and priorities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal paradigms shift in response to political, economic, social, cultural,
and technological conditions.' Oftentimes, this shift is endogenous, with devel-
opments driven by such forces as changes in local conditions or active lobbying
by domestic, or even foreign, industries.2 At other times, however, the shift is
1. See generally Monroe E. Price, The Newness ofNew Technology, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1885 (2001)
(discussing the conceptualization, evaluation, and manifestation of technological change in the process of reshap-
ing laws and institutions).
2. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW
To LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004) [hereinafter LESSIG, FREE CULTURE] (articulating
the needs for developing a free culture movement); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001) (lamenting how the expansion ofintellectual property laws has stifled
creativity and innovation); JESSICA LrrMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001) (detailing the expansion of copyright
laws in the United States in the past two centuries); SIVA VALDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS:
THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001) (describing how the increas-
ing corporate control over the use of software, digital music, images, films, books, and academic materials has
steered copyright law away from its historical design to promote creativity and cultural vibrancy); Jessica D.
exogenous, largely a result of what comparative law scholars have widely re-
ferred to as "legal transplant"3-the process by which legal paradigms, rules,
norms, practices, or values are being "imported" from abroad.4
At the global level, power asymmetry has caused legal paradigms to diffuse
from developed to developing countries. In the intellectual property area, the
most widely cited example is the effort by the European Union, Japan, and the
United States to transplant high intellectual property standards on to developing
countries through the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights5 ("TRIPS Agreement") of the World Trade Organization ("WTO").
6
A more recent example is the developed countries' aggressive use of bilateral,
regional, and plurilateral trade agreements to push for even higher intellectual
Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987) [hereinafter Litman,
Copyright, Compromise] (discussing the public choice problems in the copyright lawmaking process).
3. For discussions of legal transplant, see generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993); Peter K. Yu, The Transplant and Transformation ofIntellectual
Property Laws in China, in GOVERNANCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA AND EUROPE 20 (Nari
Lee et al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter Yu, Transplant and Transformation]; Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants
in International Copyright: Some Problems ofMethod, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199 (1994); Otto Kahn-Freund,
On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. I (1974); Peter K. Yu, Can the Canadian UGC
Exception Be TransplantedA broad?, 26 INTELL. PROP. J. 175 (2014) [hereinafter Yu, Canadian UGCException];
Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693
(2010) [hereinafter Yu, Digital Copyright Reform].
4. See Geller, supra note 3, at 199 (defining "legal transplant" as "any legal notion or rule which, after
being developed in a 'source' body of law, is ... introduced into another, 'host' body of law").
5. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
6. See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 3-27
(3d ed. 2008) (describing the origins and development of the TRIPS Agreement); DUNCAN MATTHEWS,
GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2002) (examining the role of intel-
lectual property industries in the TRIPS negotiations); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE
GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 96-120 (2003) (recounting the trilateral intellectual prop-
erty discussions among the United States, the European Union, and Japan); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11-47 (2001) (recounting the negotiation process
for the TRIPS Agreement); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS andIts Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 371-
79 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, TRIPS andIts Discontents] (examining four different accounts of origins of the TRIPS
Agreement).
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property standards in developing countries.' Among the more controversial ex-
amples are the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement ("ACTA"), the Trans-Pa-
cific Partnership ("TPP")9-now the Comprehensive and Progressive Agree-
ment for Trans-Pacific Partnership ("CPTPP")1o-and the proposed Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership ("RCEP").11
Thus far, legal paradigms have moved from developed to developing coun-
tries, but rarely in the opposite direction.12 Such one-sided diffusion is under-
standable. As Thomas Kuhn stated in the postscript of his seminal work, The
7. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (Christopher Heath & An-
selm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007) (collecting essays that discuss free trade agreements in the intellectual
property context); Robert Burrell & Kimberlee Weatherall, Exporting Controversy? Reactions to the Copyright
Provisions of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement: Lessons for U.S. Trade Policy, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
& POL'Y 259 (criticizing the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement); Peter K. Yu, Currents and Cross-
currents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 323, 392-400 (2004) [herein-
after Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents] (discussing the growing use of bilateral and regional trade agreements to
push for higher intellectual property standards).
8. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M. 243 (2011). For
the Author's discussions of ACTA, see generally Peter K. Yu, The ACTA/7PP Country Clubs, in ACCESS TO
INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE: 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND KNOWLEDGE
GOVERNANCE 258 (Dana Beldiman ed., 2014) [hereinafter Yu, ACTA/TPP Country Clubs]; Peter K. YuACTA
and Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1 (2011); Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52
IDEA 239 (2012); Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears ofACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975 (2011) [here-
inafter Yu, Six Secret Fears].
9. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text. For the Author's discussions of the TPP, see generally Yu,
ACTA/TPP Country Clubs, supra note 8; Peter K. Yu, TPP, RCEP, and the Crossvergence ofAsian Intellectual
Property Standards, in GOVERNING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER:
REGULATORY DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE IN THE AGE OF MEGAREGIONALS 277 (Peng Shin-yi et al. eds.,
2018) [hereinafter Yu, TPP, RCEP, and Crossvergence]; Peter K. Yu, TPP, RCEP and the Future ofCopyright
Norm-setting in the Asian Pacific, in MAKING COPYRIGHT WORK FOR THE ASIAN PACIFIC: JUXTAPOSING
HARMONISATION WITH FLEXIBILITY 19 (Susan Corbett & Jessica C. Lai eds., 2018) [hereinafter Yu, TPP, RCEP
and Copyright Norm-setting]; Peter K. Yu, Thinking About the Trans-Pacijic Partnership (and a Mega-Regional
Agreement on Life Support), 20 SMU SCL & TECH. L. REV. 97 (2017) [hereinafter Yu, Thinking About TPP];
Peter K. Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, 37 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1129 (2014).
10. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Mar. 8,2018, https://www.
mfat.govt.nzen/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-concluded-but-not-in-force/cptpp/compre-
hensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership-text; seealso CPTPP v. TPP, N.Z. MINISTRY
FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/agreements-under-negotia-
tion/cptpp-2/tpp-and-cptpp-the-differences-explained/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2018) (explaining the differences
between the TPP and the CPTPP); Yu, Thinking About TPP, supra note 9, at 104-06 (discussing the CPTPP).
11. See ASEAN Plus Six, Joint Declaration on the Launch ofNegotiations for the Regional Comprehen-
sive Economic Partnership (Nov. 20, 2012), https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/negotiations/rcep/news/Docu-
ments/joint-declaration-on-the-launch-of-negotiations-for-the-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership
.pdf (launching the RCEP negotiations). For the Author's analysis of the RCEP, see generally Yu, TPP, RCEP,
and Crossvergence, supra note 9; Yu, TPP, RCEP and Copyright Norm-setting, supra note 9; Peter K. Yu, The
RCEP and Trans-Pacific Intellectual Property Norms, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673 (2017).
12. See sources cited supra note 3.
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Structure of Scientific Revolutions,13 paradigms are "exemplars."
14 Because de-
veloping countries have limited geopolitical power, economic resources, and le-
gal capabilities, they rarely succeed in developing exemplar models or best prac-
tices that attract the attention of developed countries, not to mention their
eventual adoption.15
Nevertheless, some transplants from developed countries do involve legal
paradigms that align well with the needs, interests, conditions, and priorities of
developing countries. A case in point is the transplant of the fair use model in
U.S. copyright law, which has attracted considerable debate, research, and policy
attention in the past few decades.16 At the time of writing, Israel, Liberia, Malay-
sia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan have
13. THoMAs S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 187 (3d ed. 1996). This postscript
did not appear in the original edition, but was added a few years later in the second edition. See Cathleen C.
Loving & William W. Cobem, Invoking Thomas Kuhn: What Citation Analysis Reveals About Science Educa-
tion, 9 SCl. & EDUC. 187, 188 (2000) (recalling "there is the original 1962 edition, the revised 1970 edition with
postscript, and a 1996 third edition with an index added").
14. As he elaborated:
Because the term has assumed a life of its own,... I shall here substitute "exemplars." By it Imean, initially,
the concrete problem-solutions that students encounter from the start of their scientific education, whether
in laboratories, on examinations, or at the ends of chapters in science texts. To these shared examples should,
however, be added at least some of the technical problem-solutions found in the periodical literature that
scientists encounter during their post-educational research careers and that also show them by example how
their job is to be done. More than other sorts of components of the disciplinary matrix, differences between
sets of exemplars provide the community fine-structure of science.
KUHN, supra note 13, at 187; see also id. at 23 ("Paradigms gain their status because they are more successful
than their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute.").
15. The closest example is what some commentators have referred to as the "Beijing Consensus." For
discussions of the Beijing Consensus, see generally THE BEIING CONSENSUS?: How CHINA HAS CHANGED
WESTERN IDEAS OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Chen Weitseng ed., 2017); STEFAN A. HALPER, THE
BEUING CONSENSUS: How CHINA'S AUTHORITARIAN MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(2010); JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, THE BELTING CONSENSUS (2004). Nevertheless, China's unique conditions have
made the country not an ideal example. Even though it is still a developing country and has a low gross domestic
product per capita, it has the world's second largest, or largest, aggregate economy, depending on one's metrics
or methodology. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Chinese Century, VANITY FAIR (Jan. 2015), https://www.vani-
tyfair.com/news/2015/01/china-worlds-largest-economy ("2014 was the last year in which the United States
could claim to be the world's largest economic power. China enters 2015 in the top position, where it will likely
remain for a very long time, if not forever."). Policy-makers and commentators have also continued to debate
what constitutes the Beijing Consensus, which is not as well defined as the Washington Consensus. As I noted
in an earlier article:
The defining feature of the Chinese model-or what some commentators have described as the "Beijing
Consensus" or, more modestly, the "Beijing Proposal"-is not a definitive formula of success. Rather, it is
the Chinese leaders' pragmatic approach in "groping for stones to cross the river" (mozhe shitou guohe) and
their willingness to consider a wide variety of options.
Peter K. Yu, Five Oft-repeated Questions About China's Recent Rise as a Patent Power, 2013 CARDOZO L. REV.
DE NOVo 78, 99 (footnotes omitted); see also John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in
LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: How MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 7, 7-20 (John Williamson ed., 1990) (coining the
term "Washington Consensus" to cover recommendations on fiscal deficits, public expenditure priorities, tax
reform, interest rates, the exchange rate, trade policy, foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, and
property rights).
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018) (codifying fair use).
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adopted the fair use regime or its close variants." Australia, Hong Kong, and
Ireland have also explored whether they should follow suit.18 In addition, there
are remarkable similarities between the fair dealing regime in Canada and the
fair use regime in the United States.1 9
Because legal literature has thus far under-analyzed the transplant of the
U.S. fair use model,20 this Article focuses its analysis on fair use transplants.
Such a focus is important for four reasons. First, the analysis enables us to de-
velop a deeper understanding of the U.S. copyright system and its success in
promoting innovation and technological development.2 1 Such an understanding
will be highly valuable if the U.S. copyright system is to undertake major reform
in the near future.22 Second, the analysis provides a nice contrast to the existing
17. See JONATHAN BAND & JONATHAN GERAFI, THE FAIR USE/FAIR DEALING HANDBOOK 30, 35-38, 46,
55-57, 60-62, 64 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2333863 (listing the fair use provisions in Israel, Liberia, Ma-
laysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan). This Article uses the phrase "close
variants" because Malaysia and Singapore technically have a fair dealing regime that functions like a fair use
regime. See Peter K. Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants, 7 LAWS 9, at 5-7 (2018), http://www.mdpi.
com/2075-471X/7/1/9 [hereinafter Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants].
18. See AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N [ALRC], COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: FINAL REPORT
123-60 (2013) [hereinafter ALRC FINAL REPORT] (recommending the introduction of a fair use exception);
COPYRIGHT REVIEW COMM., MODERNISING COPYRIGHT 93-94 (2013) (Jr.) [hereinafter CRC FINAL REPORT]
(recommending the introduction of the fair use exception as a new Section 49A of the Irish Copyright and Related
Rights Act); LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, AMENDMENTS TO BE MOVED BY THE HONOURABLE CHAN KAM-LAM, SBS,
JP 4 (2015) (H.K.), http://www.legco.gov.hklyrl5-16/english/counmtg/papers/cm2Ol51209cb3-219-e.pdf (LC
Paper No. CB(3) 219/15-16) [hereinafter BILLS COMMITTEE'S AMENDMENTS] (providing the text of the fair use
proposal that was tabled for legislative debate in Hong Kong).
19. See Michael Geist, Fairness Found: How Canada Quietly Shifted from Fair Dealing to Fair Use, in
THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: How THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN
COPYRIGHT LAW 157, 176 (Michael Geist ed., 2013) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY] ("Fair dealing in
Canada still requires a two-stage analysis, yet the cumulative effect of legislative reform and the Supreme Court
decisions is that the first stage has become so easy to meet that Canada has a fair use provision in everything but
name only."); Ariel Katz, Fair Use 2.0: The Rebirth of Fair Dealing in Canada, in COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY,
supra, at 93, 95 ("[D]espite abundant contemporary literature that highlights a seeming dichotomy between the
open-ended US-style fair use, and the supposedly close-ended fair dealing, this dichotomy is false." (footnote
omitted)).
20. For rare discussions of the transplant of the U.S. fair use model, see generally Michael Birnhack, Ju-
dicial Snapshots and Fair Use Theory, 5 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 264 (2015); Yu, Customizing Fair Use
Transplants, supra note 17; Justyna Zygmunt, Legal Transplant of the US. Fair Use Clause-A Surgery That
Cannot Go Wrong? Some Remarks on Using the Theory of Legal Transplants, 4 INTERNETOWY PRZEGLAD
PRAWNICzY TBSP UJ [INTERNET L. REV. ASS'N L. STuDENTS' LIBR. JAGIELLONIAN U.] 141 (2016) (Pol.).
21. See ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 104-08 (discussing how fair use can assist innovation);
CRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 93 (noting that the adoption of the proposed fair use doctrine "will send
important signals about the nature of the Irish innovation ecosystem, . . . provide the Irish economy with a com-
petitive advantage in Europe, and ... give Irish law a leadership position in EU copyright debates"); IAN
HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH 44 (2011) (noting
the contribution of fair use to "creating a positive environment ... for innovation and investment in innovation").
22. See generally INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY,
CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL EcONOMY (2013) [hereinafter U.S. GREEN PAPER] (assessing
current policy relating to copyright and the Internet and identifying issues that are being addressed by courts and
are ripe for further discussion or development of solutions); INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, WHITE PAPER ON REMIXES, FIRST SALE, AND STATUTORY DAMAGES: COPYRIGHT POLICY,
CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2016) [hereinafter U.S. WHITE PAPER] (recommend-
ing legislative fixes concerning the award of statutory damages, but refraining from proposing changes to the
treatment of remixes and exhaustion of rights); Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L.
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literature on the transplant of U.S. models via TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and
plurilateral trade agreements. While most of this literature has been highly criti-
cal of U.S. transplants,2 3 the comparative analysis in this Article allows us to
explore further whether the problems originate from the legal transplant process
or from the uncustornized transplants that do not fit the diverging local condi-
tions. Third, the analysis of fair use transplants brings together a variety of fair
use models. Discussing these different models in a single article will help pro-
mote comparative research in this area. Such discussion will also allow us to
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each model. Fourth, the analysis drives
us to think more deeply about the overall law reform process-at both the do-
mestic and global levels. It invites us to not only critically examine the benefits
and drawbacks of legal transplants, but also explore the considerable complexi-
ties within the law reform process.
Part II of this Article reviews the literature concerning paradigm shift, in
particular Thomas Kuhn's seminal work.24 It discusses the specific insights the
literature has provided to the study of fair use transplants. The focus on paradigm
shift is particularly instructive considering that the term has been widely and re-
peatedly used in jurisdictions that have introduced the U.S. fair use model to
replace their existing system of copyright limitations and exceptions.2 5
Part III documents a growing trend toward the worldwide adoption of the
U.S. fair use model and therefore a slowly emerging paradigm shift in interna-
tional copyright norms. This Part also identifies a countertrend toward the reten-
tion of the status quo. The juxtaposition of these two trends explain why juris-
dictions that set out to transplant U.S.-style fair use ended up adopting a hybrid
model. Thus, instead of a paradigm shift, the transplants in these jurisdictions
facilitated a paradigm evolution.2 6
Part IV interrogates the different primary causes behind such an evolution.
While many possible factors exist within and outside the legal system, this Part
focuses on those relating to intellectual property law, international and compar-
ative law, and the legislative process. The discussion underscores the tremendous
difficulty in pinpointing the causes behind a paradigm evolution and predicting
& ARTS 315 (2013) (calling for a comprehensive review and revision of U.S. copyright law); Peter K. Yu, The
Next Great Copyright Act Should Be Flexible and Forward-Looking, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 6, 2014, 4:49
AM), https://theconversation.com/the-next-great-copyright-act-should-be-flexible-and-forward-looking-32782
(calling for forward-looking copyright reform).
23. See generally Burrell & Weatherall, supra note 7 (criticizing the copyright provisions of the U.S.-
Australia Free Trade Agreement); Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 866-
70 (2007) [hereinafter Yu, The International Enclosure Movement] (discussing the enclosure of policy space
through the introduction of TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade agreements); Yu, Six Secret
Fears, supra note 8, at 1028-44 (discussing how the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement could transplant
higher yet potentially harmful intellectual property standards onto the soils of developing countries).
24. See infra Section H.A.
25. See, e.g., BILLS COMM. ON COPYRIGHT (AMENDMENT) BILL 2014, PAPER FOR THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
MEETING ON 13 NOVEMBER 2015, at 14 (2015) (H.K.), http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrl5-16/english/hc/pa-
pers/hc20151113cb4-199-e.pdf (LC Paper No. CB(4)199/15-16) [hereinafter BILLS COMMITTEE'S REPORT] ("A
shift to fair use would represent a fundamental revamp of our copyright regime and must be carefully considered
in the light of a proper consultation exercise, and is beyond the scope of the current round of legislative update.").
26. Thanks to Lydia Loren for pushing the Author to focus on paradigm evolution.
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when and at what pace a paradigm will evolve. Even when we single out causes
within the legal system, contributing factors can come from many different areas
of the law.27
Part V concludes with recommendations concerning future efforts to
broaden copyright limitations and exceptions in the United States and across the
world. This Part outlines six courses of action that seek to improve these reform
efforts. It then identifies three modalities of evolution that can help tailor the
transplanted fair use paradigm to local needs, interests, conditions, and priorities.
Such tailoring will enlarge the flexibilities available in the copyright system
while fostering a more appropriate balance between access and proprietary con-
trol. Because the modalities discussed in this Part focus on ways to combine
rules, standards, and institutions, the analysis will be relevant to not only copy-
right reform, but also legal reform in other areas of the law.
II. PARADIGM SHIFT
A. Theory
As far as paradigm shifts are concerned, the logical starting point is The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which Thomas Kuhn published in 1962.28
This classic is important to not only scientists, but also those researching in law
and other disciplines.2 9 Of particular interest is the book's description of the pro-
cess of change that leads to the development of new paradigms.30
As the book describes at length, the process begins with a crisis.3 1 Until that
point, most anomalies are usually ignored, due to the fact that they do not fit well
with the prevailing paradigm.3 2 As anomalies continue to build up, however, sci-
entists start to question whether the existing paradigm remains valid, provoking
"a period of pronounced professional insecurity."33 As more and more scientists
conduct research to address this crisis, challenge the preexisting paradigm, and
27. See infra Section IV.A.
28. KuHN, supra note 13.
29. As Russell Pearce observed:
Kuhn and other commentators have not limited this analysis to scientific communities. Any definable com-
munity can possess a paradigm. While asserting the uniqueness of scientific communities, Kuhn acknowl-
edged the utility of his approach for analyzing change in music, art, literature, and political development.
Many legal scholars have similarly applied Kuhn's analysis in areas as diverse as legal history, legal theory,
economics, constitutional law, and civil procedure.
Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the
Conduct and Reputation ofthe Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1236-37 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
30. See generally KuHN, supra note 13.
31. See id at 67 (providing illustrations of scientific fields that were "in a state of growing crisis").
32. See id at 64 ("In science, ... novelty emerges only with difficulty, manifested by resistance, against a
background provided by expectation. Initially only the anticipated and usual are experienced even under circum-
stances where anomaly is later observed.").
33. As Kuhn wrote:
[Tihe emergence of new theories is generally preceded by a period of pronounced professional insecurity.
As one might expect, that insecurity is generated by the persistent failure of the puzzles of normal science
to come out as they should. Failure of existing rules is the prelude to a search for new ones.
Id. at 67-68.
118 [Vol. 2019
consider alternatives, a new paradigm begins to emerge.34 At some point, the old
paradigm shifts to the new paradigm.35 With that change, stability begins to be
built around the latter,36 and the revolution is complete.
Using Kuhn's terminology and applying his paradigm shift to the growing
transformation of law practice, Russell Pearce described this process of change
as follows:
Kuhn finds that scientific communities use paradigms to organize their
problem-solving efforts. In what Kuhn describes as "normal science," prac-
titioners who "have undergone similar educations and professional initia-
tions" use their shared paradigm as the determinant of "legitimate methods,
problems, and standards of solution." In normal science, the community
rejects ideas inconsistent with the paradigm, often without even evaluating
their significance.
At the same time that a paradigm constrains discourse, its problem-
solving nature ensures the paradigm's eventual demise. The task of prob-
lem-solving will inevitably result in identification of a problem that is not
susceptible to problem-solving efforts under the paradigm. That problem
becomes an "anomaly" that provokes a crisis. A time of crisis is one of
"extraordinary science" where the paradigm itself comes into question. In
this "period of pronounced professional insecurity," consensus regarding
the constitution of the governing paradigm disintegrates, proposals for new
paradigms proliferate, and the community "turns" to philosophy as it re-
visits first principles.
When the scientific community cannot resolve the crisis by solving
the problem under the paradigm or bracketing the problem for the future,
it replaces the old paradigm with a new one in what Kuhn calls a revolution.
The new paradigm proposes to "solve the problems that have led the old
one to a crisis." Whether the new paradigm succeeds in a revolution de-
pends more on the power of conversion than logical argument. No "logi-
cal" choice is available between competing paradigms that "disagree about
what is a problem and what a solution." Newer members of the community
tend to be more o en to new paradigms and more senior members tend to
be more resistant.
To be sure, Kuhn's paradigm shift focuses on science3 8 something that
can be proved or disproved objectively. Among the shifts illustrated in his book
34. See id. at 77-91 (discussing how scientists respond to anomalies and crises).
35. See id. at 77 ("The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept
another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature and
with each other."); see also id. at 79 ("To reject one paradigm without simultaneously substituting another is to
reject science itself."). But see NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & ELI M. SALZBERGER, THE LAW AND EcONOMICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL AGE: THE LIMrrs OF ANALYSIS 15 (2015) ("[ln legal research, and in
the social sciences more generally, different paradigms can coexist in parallel.").
36. See KUHN, supra note 13, at 77 ("[O]nce it has achieved the status ofparadigm, a scientific theory is
declared invalid only if an alternate candidate is available to take its place.").
37. Pearce, supra note 29, at 1234-36.
38. See KUHN, supra note 13, at xi (noting Kuhn's "decision to deal ... exclusively with" physical sci-
ence).
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are those "major turning points in scientific development associated with the
names of Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, and Einstein." 3 9 Although legal de-
bates cannot be resolved in a similar fashion,40 a quick search on the LexisNexis
or Westlaw database or via Google reveals a growing number of law review ar-
ticles focusing on paradigm shifts.41 Indeed, a number of them have provided
extended discussions of Kuhn's theory and follow-up writings,4 2 which have
been widely studied and will not be repeated in this Article.
The framework by which paradigms shift and settle in response to crises
also finds strong support in existing legal literature. For instance, the evolution-
ary path dependence theory, which draws on the literature concerning biological
evolution and "punctuated equilibrium,"43 shows that legal "change occurs in fits
and starts rather than in slow and steady gradual steps."" As Oona Hathaway
explained:
In the punctuated equilibrium model, . . .the ultimate outcome of a process
of change is usually indeterminate because punctuated equilibria are
marked by "contingency": "the inability of the theory to predict or explain,
either deterministically or probabilistically, the occurrence of a specific
outcome." A contingent event is not necessarily random, but it cannot be
explained by the variables available to theorists. For example, biologists
would treat a cold winter as contingent because it is outside the explanatory
framework of biological theories. Because it is marked by contingency, the
punctuated equilibria model is unable to predict the arrival of periods of
rapid change in advance. Once a period of change has occurred, however,
the theory specifies that a new period of stability shaped by the changes
that occurred during the most recent punctuation will follow. 45
39. Id. at 6.
40. See Ubaldus de Vries, Kuhn and Legal Research: A Reflexive Paradigmatic View on Legal Research,
3 RECHT EN METHODE IN ONDERZOEK EN ONDERWIJS [LAW & METHOD] 7, 11 (2013) (Neth.) ("[The theories in]
social scientific research or esearch in the humanities ... are descriptive and evaluative rather than verifiable by
means of established instruments of verification: testing, experiments, etc. And, indeed, modem law is configured
through power relations, considering its main author: the state.").
41. See Google Scholar, http://scholar.google.com (search in search bar for the word "legal" and the phrase
"paradigm shift" in quotation marks) (last visited Nov. 10, 2018); LexisNexis, https://advance.lexis.com/ (follow
"Secondary Materials" hyperlink; then search in search bar for "paradigm shift" in quotation marks) (last visited
Nov. 10, 2018); Westlaw, https://1.next.westlaw.com (follow "Secondary Sources" hyperlink; then search in
search bar for "paradigm shift" in quotation marks) (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
42. See generally de Vries, supra note 40 (arguing that a better understanding of the Kuhnian structure of
scientific research is useful in understanding modem legal research); Pearce, supra note 29 (using paradigm shifts
to explore the growing transformation of law practice from a profession to a business); Nigel Stobbs, The Nature
ofJuristic Paradigms Exploring the Theoretical and Conceptual Relationship Between Adversarialism and Ther-
apeutic Jurisprudence, 4 WASH. U. JuRIs. REv. 97 (2011) (exploring whether the adversarial paradigm among
mainstream judges has been, and can be, shifted to one embracing "therapeutic" and "problem solving" prac-
tices).
43. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern ofLegal Change in a Com-
mon Law System, 86 IOWA L. REv. 601, 607 (2001).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 615-16 (footnote omitted) (quoting James Mahoney, Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,
29 THEORY & SOC'Y 507, 513 (2000)).
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B. Crisis
The previous Section provides a brief overview of Kuhn's theory. The next
three Sections focus on its application to the intellectual property area. Section
B discusses the crisis that has occurred in this area, and Sections C and D intro-
duce the old and new paradigms. The last two Sections also explore the appro-
priateness of using the term "paradigm shift" to describe the change from the old
model to the new model.
In the intellectual property area, the crisis that helps precipitate a potential
paradigm shift in international copyright norms come in three distinct directions.
The first crisis-contributing development concerns the advent of new technolo-
gies. Commentators have widely noted the unprecedented changes brought about
by the Internet and new communication technologies.46 Indeed, the past twenty
years have seen voluminous literature covering the law's interaction with those
technologies, 47 raising questions about whether legal scholars should devote their
attention to study cyberlaw.48
Nevertheless, the communications revolution brought about by the Internet
is only the tip of the iceberg. The past few years alone have seen a rapid prolif-
eration of other new technologies, such as those relating to Big Data, the Internet
of Things, 3D printing, artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous vehicles,
nanotechnology, and synthetic biology. These new technologies threaten to
transform our daily life and have thereby raised many important and exciting
questions in the intellectual property field. As Mark Lemley described:
3D printers can manufacture physical goods based on any digital design.
While home 3D printers are so far quite limited in size and materials, there
are tens of thousands of printing designs available on the Internet already,
and larger commercial-scale printers can print anything from circuit boards
to rocket engines to human organs on site for the cost of the raw materials
and some electricity. Synthetic biology has automated the manufacture of
copies of not just existing genetic sequences, but also any custom-made
gene sequence, allowing anyone who wants to create a gene sequence of
their own to upload the sequence to a company that will "print" it using the
basic building blocks of genetics. And advances in robotics generalize the
46. See generally COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS & THE EMERGING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNC[L, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
(2000) (discussing the challenges digital technology has posed to the copyright regime).
47. For select pioneering works in this area, see generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE (1st ed. 1999); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law andBorders-The Rise ofLaw in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy
Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REv. 553 (1998).
48. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
207 (questioning the need to study cyberlaw as a distinct legal subject); Lawrence Lessig, The Law ofthe Horse:
What Cyber Law Might Teach, 113 HARv. L. REv. 501 (1999) (responding to Judge Easterbrook).
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principle beyond goods, offering the prospect that many of the services hu-
mans now supply will be provided free of charge by general-purpose ma-
chines that can be programmed to perform a variety of complex functions.49
The second crisis-contributing development relates to the emergence of
new intellectual property norms, thanks to the increasing efforts to establish
higher intellectual property standards through TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and
plurilateral trade agreements.50 While the TRIPS Agreement has already raised
the standards in many developing countries, the new TRIPS-plus standards will
raise those standards even further.5 1 For those developing countries that continue
to struggle with TRIPS standards and that have been working hard to extend their
transition periods, the arrival of these TRIPS-plus standards foretells even
greater challenges ahead.52 The public health pandemics in Sub-Sahara Africa,
which have been caused by a lack of access to essential medicines, also call into
question the legitimacy of the international intellectual property regime.53
The final crisis-contributing development pertains to the arrival of new
ideas. The past two decades have seen rapid developments in the free software,
open source,54 free culture, and access to knowledge movements.56 In the past
49. Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REv. 460, 461-66 (2015) (footnote
omitted).
50. See sources cited supra note 7.
51. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 23, at 855-70 (discussing the enclosure of
policy space through the introduction of the TRIPS Agreement and TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and plurilat-
eral trade agreements).
52. See Peter K. Yu, Virotech Patents, Viropiracy, and Viral Sovereignty, 45 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1563, 1568
(2013) (discussing the developing countries' push for extending the transition periods under the TRIPS Agree-
ment).
53. See id at 1627 ("[B]ecause the high TRIPS standards often ignore the needs, interests, conditions, and
priorities of the latter group of countries, the legitimacy of the TRIPS Agreement, and by extension the WTO,
have now been called into question."); SELL, supra note 6, at 173 ("The shaky foundations of [the TRIPS] regime
raise important concerns about accountability and legitimacy."); Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of
the TRIPS Agreement, 46 Hous. L. REv. 979, 1024 (2009) ("[T]he TRIPS Agreement is now in a deepening
crisis. Its legitimacy has been called into question by the high standards of protection and enforcement hat ignore
the needs, interests, and goals of the less-developed member states.").
54. As Adrian Johns observed:
Claims for a new economics of creativity center overtly on the phenomenon of open-source software, which
exploits properties of digital networks for which there is allegedly no precedent. But they also draw support
from deeper conviction about how knowledge is properly generated, distributed, and preserved. The mid-
century insistence that openness was a guiding norm of true scientific research took on new force in the
context of molecular biology and biotechnology.
ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG To GATES 509 (2009).
55. See generally LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 2 (articulating the needs for developing a free culture
movement).
56. For discussions of the access to knowledge debate, see generally ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (GaElle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010); Amy Kapczynski, The Access
to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics ofIntellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008). In the past
decades, there has been considerable activism in the intellectual property area. As Amy Kapczynski observed:
Who would have thought, a decade or two ago, that college students would speak of the need to change
copyright law with "something like the reverence that earlier generations displayed in talking about social
or racial equality"? Or that advocates of "farmers' rights" could mobilize hundreds of thousands of people
to protest seed patents and an [intellectual property] treaty? Or that AIDS activists would engage in civil
disobedience to challenge patents on medicines? Or that programmers would descend upon the European
Parliament to protest software patents?
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few years alone, there has been a growing volume of "intellectual production
without intellectual property" literature.57 While the exploration of alternative
approaches to incentivize creativity and innovation is both important and excit-
ing and should be carefully addressed in the intellectual property debate, their
arrival comes at a time when the younger generation actively questions the basic
premises of the intellectual property system.18 The growing emphasis away from
this system has therefore made it even more difficult for the system to maintain
its traditional support.
In light of these three crisis-contributing developments, policy-makers and
commentators have questioned whether the time is ripe for a Kuhnian paradigm
shift. As Adrian Johns noted provocatively in his latest book, Piracy, crisis in the
creative area could lead to a "profound shift in the relation between creativity
and commerce."5 9 The book showed convincingly that the history of copyright
and creativity is filled with this type of shift:
Such turning points have happened before-about once every century, in
fact, since the end of the Middle Ages. The last major one occurred at the
height of the industrial age, and catalyzed the invention of intellectual prop-
erty. Before that, another took place in the Enlightenment, when it led to
the emergence of the first modern copyright system and the first modern
patents regime. And before that, there was the creation of piracy in the
1660s-1680s. By extrapolation, we are already overdue to experience an-
other revolution of the same magnitude. If it does happen in the near future,
it may well bring down the curtain on what will then, in retrospect, come
Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 262,263 (2008).
57. As Amy Kapczynski recently observed:
[Intellectual property] scholarship has for decades been centered on a simple account: [intellectual property]
is necessary to achieve the information production that we as a society desire. But over the last few years,
the field has come to recognize that [intellectual property] as an approach has both significant costs and
substantial limits. in response, an important new scholarly literature on "intellectual production without
intellectual property," or "IF without IP" has emerged.
Amy Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual Property Law: Open Science in Influenza, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
1539, 1542-43 (2017) (footnotes omitted). For scholarship in this area, see generally KAL RAUSTIALA &
CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF EcONOMY: How IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012); Jacob
Loshin, Secrets Revealed: Protecting Magicians' Intellectual Property Without Law, in LAW AND MAGIC: A
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 123 (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010); Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Conse-
quences ofSauces: Should Thomas Keller's Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J.
1121 (2007); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP NeedIP? Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the
Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOzO L. REV. 1437 (2010); Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman,
There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence ofIntellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of
Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REv. 1787 (2008); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox:
Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006).
58. See Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 881, 938
(2011) ("Many members of [the younger] generation do not share the norms reflected in existing copyright law.
Many of them also do not understand copyright law or see the benefits of complying with it."); Peter K. Yu, P2P
and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 756-63 (2005) (articulating the view that the
ongoing "copyright wars" can be seen as a transitional clash between the copyright-abiding generation and Gen-
eration Y).
59. JOHNS, supra note 54, at 498.
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to be seen as a coherent epoch of about 150 years: the era of intellectual
property.60
If the existing intellectual property system is to survive the ongoing crisis,61
so as to avoid what Professor Johns referred to as "a reformation of creative
rights, responsibilities, and privileges,"62 it will have to be reshaped through a
number of drastic measures. Considering that the U.S. fair use model has been
widely extolled for its ability to provide what the United States Supreme Court
has described as "breathing space,"63 one has to wonder whether the transplant
of the U.S. fair use model across the world could help avoid this potential radical
paradigm shift in the area of copyright and creativity.
C. Old Paradigm
To examine whether a paradigm shift in international copyright norms has
occurred, it is important to identify both the old and new paradigms. Although
questions will arise as to whether the models discussed in this Article are para-
digms in the Kuhnian sense, strong evidence supports the use of paradigmatic
language to describe these two models. As Kuhn defined, a paradigm shift in-
volves not only a dramatic change in the path of scientific research but also in
the worldview subscribed by scientists.6 4 To provide supporting evidence, this
and the next Section explore the strong resemblance between a Kuhnian para-
digm shift and the ongoing effort to reform the existing system of copyright lim-
itations and exceptions. This Section discusses the old fair dealing paradigm, and
the next Section discusses the new fair use paradigm.
60. Id. at 508.
61. Interestingly, Professor Johns brought up Kuhn's work:
[I]t is no coincidence that he problem facing intellectual property coincides with a period of deep unease
about the practices that society entrusts with discovering and imparting formal knowledge in general. The
foundations and status of the academic disciplines are in question, no less than those of intellectual property.
But the modem disciplinary system and the modem principle of intellectual property are achievements of
the era culminating in the late nineteenth century, and the same departure of creative authorship to new
projects and identities underlines the anxieties of each. In each case new realms of creative work can be
accommodated into the existing system, but doing so involves ad hoc compromises and creates increasingly
stark inconsistencies. At some point the resulting contraption comes to resemble too clearly for comfort
Thomas Kuhn's famous portrayal of a "crisis" state in the sciences.
Id. at 516-17.
62. See id at 517 ("A reformation of creative rights, responsibilities, and privileges could ... occur in
reaction to a crisis in intellectual property.").
63. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (noting "the fair use doctrine's
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright"); see also William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter,
Fair Use Misconstrued Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 667, 668 (1993)
("[Flair use is a critical safety valve of copyright."). See generally Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space,
30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429 (2007) (proposing modifications to existing copyright law that would create breath-
ing space in copyright cases that raise free speech interests).
64. See KuHN, supra note 13, at 111 ("[P]aradigm changes do cause scientists to see the world of their
research-engagement differently. In so far as their only recourse to that world is through what they see and do,
we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different world."); see also Stobbs, supra
note 42, at 107 ("A paradigm is more than just the currently dominant set of exemplars underpinning a disci-
pline-it is a reflection of a particular worldview within which that exemplary framework connects to other
disciplines and other types of human experience-from which it draws its normative force.").
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The fair dealing paradigm traces its origin to the traditional English com-
mon law doctrine of fair abridgement.6 5 Although efforts were made to introduce
fair dealing provisions into the U.K. Copyright Law 1842,66 its place in copyright
law was not solidified until the doctrine's codification in the U.K. Copyright Act
1911,67 or what some commentators have referred to as the "Imperial Copyright
Act." 68 Considered as an "exemplar," in the Kuhnian sense,69 this model has
since been transplanted from the United Kingdom to British colonies across the
world. These colonies included Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and
Sri Lanka, jurisdictions that have now adopted or proposed to adopt fair use.70
The paradigmatic nature of the U.K. Copyright Act 1911 became even
more obvious when one considers the statute's transformative impact. As Ariel
Katz observed, no apparent distinction between fair dealing and fair use existed
before the codification of the fair dealing doctrine in the 1911 Act.71 That many
former British colonies now have a standardized fair dealing regime was partly
the legacy of this highly influential statute.7 2
65. See Joseph J. Beard, Everything Old Is New Again: Dickens to Digital, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 19, 24-
26 (2004) (discussing the traditional English doctrine of fair abridgement); Matthew Sag, The Prehistory ofFair
Use, 76 BROOK. L. REv. 1371, 1379-93 (2011) (discussing this doctrine).
66. As Giuseppina D'Agostino observed:
The copyright doctrine of fair dealing could have made its first statutory appearance as early as 1842. It was
1842 when a fair dealing facsimile was introduced for debate in Parliament in the United Kingdom....
However, this provision was eventually deleted before the bill arrived to the House of Lords ....
Giuseppina D'Agostino, Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canada's Fair Dealing
to UK. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair Use, 53 McGILL L.J. 309, 312 (2008).
67. Copyright Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46 (Eng.).
68. See generally A SHIFTING EMPIRE: 100 YEARS OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT 1911 (Uma Suthersanen &
Ysolde Gendreau eds., 2013) (providing a collection of essays on the 1911 Copyright Act).
69. See KUHN, supra note 13, at 187.
70. See ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 123 ("The [Australian Law Reform Commission] recom-
mends a fair use exception with a non-exhaustive list of four faimess factors to be considered in assessing whether
use of another's copyright material is fair and a non-exhaustive list of eleven illustrative purposes."); BAND &
GERAFI, supra note 17, at 38, 55-57,60-62 (listing the fair use provisions in Malaysia, Singapore, and Sri Lanka);
BILLS COMMrrrEE's AMENDMENTS, supra note 18, at 4 (providing the text of the fair use proposal in Hong
Kong).
71. Asheobserved:
The common terminology in English copyright law prior to 1911 was often "fair use", just like the American
terminology, but it was also common to use the term "fair" as an adjective to describe specific activities,
such as "fair quotation", "fair criticism", "fair refutation", and, in the earlier cases, "fair abridgement".
Sometimes courts would not use the term "fair" but its synonyms, such as "bona fide imitations, translations
and abridgements." The switch to "fair dealing" in Commonwealth jurisdictions seems to simply follow a
terminology adopted when the doctrine was codified in 1911, but .. . there is no evidence that the switch
from "use" to "dealing" was intended to reflect any change in the law or its direction.
Katz, supra note 19, at 101-02.
72. As Ariel Katz continued:
A century ago, on 16 December 1911, the UK Copyright Act, 1911 received royal assent, and for the first
time fair dealing was explicitly recognized in the imperial copyright legislation. Ten years later, the same
fair dealing provision would appear in the Canadian Copyright Act, 1921 and would remain the basis of the
current fair dealing provisions.
Id. at 93; see Robert Burrell, Reining in Copyright Law: Is Fair Use the Answer?, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 361, 362
(2001) ("Although most former colonies have now had their own copyright legislation for a considerable number
of years, for the most part this legislation has tended to follow the Imperial model developed in 1911."); Niva
Elin-Koren, The New Frontiers of User Rights, 32 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1, 18 (2016) ("The 2007 [Israeli]
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Like fair use, which will be discussed in greater detail below, fair dealing
allows for an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work.73 Unlike fair use, however,
it promotes a closed system of copyright limitations and exceptions.74 Each fair
dealing provision is drafted with a specific purpose, or a set of related purposes.75
Unless the user's conduct falls within a specified purpose, the use will not be
permissible under copyright law.76
A case in point is Section 30(2) of the U.K. Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act 1988,77 which provides a specific copyright exception for reporting current
events. Specifically, the provision states that "[flair dealing with a work (other
than a photograph) for the purpose of reporting current events does not infringe
any copyright in the work provided that ... it is accompanied by a sufficient
acknowledgement."78 Although British judges have since interpreted this provi-
sion by incorporating factors that have been widely used in a U.S. fair use anal-
ysis,7 9 the provision only applies to conduct that fits within the specified pur-
pose-that is, reporting current events.so If the conduct at issue involves another
purpose, such as criticism or review, courts will not deem it permissible unless
they can find another relevant fair dealing provision.8 1
In short, the fair dealing regime requires governments or legislatures to
identify all the different permissible conduct ex ante.8 2 Because rapid technolog-
ical change has made it very difficult, if not impossible, for the anticipation of
all of the permissible uses and for the quick introduction of limitations and ex-
ceptions to address new uses, the purpose-based fair dealing paradigm has been
Copyright Act replaced the old British Copyright Act of 1911, which was in force ever since the establishment
of the State of Israel in 1948.").
73. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, §§ 29, 30, 30A (Eng.) (including fair dealing
provisions under Chapter M of the statute, which covers "acts permitted in relation to copyright works").
74. See Peter K. Yu, The Quest for a User-Friendly Copyright Regime in Hong Kong, 32 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 283, 327 (2016) [hereinafter Yu, Quest for User-Friendly Copyright] ("[A] better way to distinguish be-
tween fair dealing and fair use is to describe the former as a closed-ended, purpose-based r gime and the latter
as an open-ended, flexible regime.").
75. See id. at 331 ("In the case of Hong Kong, the Copyright Ordinance states that fair dealing is available
for research and private study (Section 38); criticism, review and news reporting (Section 39); giving or receiving
instruction (Section 41A); and public administration (Section 54A).").
76. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 28 (Eng.) (providing the introductory provisions
concerning the acts permitted in relation to copyright works).
77. Id. § 30(2).
78. Id.
79. See Ashdown v. Telegraph Grp. Ltd., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1142 [20] (Eng.) (interpreting Section 30(2)
through the introduction of fairness factors, such as whether the original work is published, the amount and
importance of that work, and whether the infringing work commercially competes with the protected work).
80. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 30(2) (Eng.) (covering fair dealing with a cop-
yrighted work for the purpose of reporting current events).
81. See id § 30(1) (covering fair dealing with a copyrighted work for the purpose of criticism or review).
82. See ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 97 (stating that a major shortcoming of the fair dealing
model is that it requires the government or the legislature "to identify and define ex ante all of the precise cir-
cumstances in which an exception should be available" (quoting a submission from Robert Burrell, Michael
Handler, Emily Hudson, and Kimberlee Weatherall)); see also CRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 93 ("It is
simply not possible to predict the direction in which cloud computing and 3D printing are going to go, and it is
therefore impossible to craft appropriate ex ante legal responses.").
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heavily criticized for being outdated and unresponsive to technological change.8 3
Those advocating the introduction of fair use has therefore called for a paradigm
shift.8 4
D. New Paradigm
Fair use, the new paradigm for the purposes of this Article, holds a central
place in U.S. copyright law.85 This doctrine "permits courts to avoid rigid appli-
cation of the copyright statute when ... it would stifle the very creativity which
that law is designed to foster."86 Although fair use was not codified until the
passage of the 1976 Copyright Act,87 judges, practitioners, and legal commenta-
tors have traced the doctrine back to the 1841 case of Folsom v. Marsh, which
concerned the unauthorized reproduction of President George Washington's
writings, official documents, and private letters that were extracted from a
twelve-volume book set.
Codified in Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act, the fair use doctrine
provides:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction
in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section,
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (includ-
ing multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work
in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall in-
clude-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
83. As I noted in an earlier article:
In a rapidly evolving digital environment, anticipating all of these circumstances is simply impossible. Even
if the government or the legislature is eager to quickly rectify the situation, the lengthy time needed to adopt
new fair dealing provisions will precipitate a highly undesirable catch-and-mouse chase between these pro-
visions and new digital technology. The resulting frustration illustrates why an open-ended, adaptive, and
flexible fair use regime is particularly appealing in a rapidly evolving digital environment.
Yu, Quest for User-Friendly Copyright, supra note 74, at 337 (footnote omitted).
84. See supra Section H.A (discussing the emergent trend toward the worldwide adoption of the U.S. fair
use model).
85. See U.S. GREEN PAPER, supra note 22, at 21 ("The fair use doctrine, developed by the courts and
codified in the 1976 Copyright Act, is a fundamental linchpin of the U.S. copyright system."); Pierre N. Leval,
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1107 (1990) ("Fair use should be perceived ... as a
rational, integral part of copyright, whose observance is necessary to achieve the objectives of that law."); David
Nimmer, A Modest Proposal to Streamline Fair Use Determinations, 24 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11, 11
(2006) (stating that "the safeguard of fair use constitutes a vital and indispensable part of our copyright laws");
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2618 (2009) ("Fair use is an essential
doctrine in U.S. copyright law that counterbalances what would otherwise be an unreasonably broad grant of
rights to authors and an unduly narrow set of negotiated exceptions and limitations.").
86. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. ABC, 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980).
87. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
88. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
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(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use
if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.89
Although this provision offers six examples of permissible conduct, mentioning
explicitly "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,"90 it does not limit the user's
conduct to the delineated purposes, like a fair dealing provision. Instead, Section
107 calls on judges to undertake a case-by-case balancing using multiple "fair-
ness factors," most notably the four nonexhaustive factors listed in the provi-
sion.91
The U.S. fair use provision has therefore created an open system of copy-
right limitations and exceptions. Such open-endedness i especially attractive for
"creating a positive environment ... for innovation and investment in innova-
tion." 9 2 Many policy-makers and commentators have also credited the provision
for the success of U.S. technology companies.93 Notable examples include
Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple, which some Europeans have lumped
together as "GAFA." 94 Given the benefits provided by the fair use model, it is
understandable why policy-makers and commentators have called for a paradigm
shift to that model.95 Indeed, Australia, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Liberia, Ma-
laysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan have al-
ready adopted or proposed to adopt the fair use regime or its close variants.96
89. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
90. Id.
91. The list is nonexhaustive because "[t]he terms 'including' and 'such as' are illustrative and not limita-
tive." Id. § 101.
92. HARGREAVES, supra note 21, at 44.
93. See id. (discussing the benefits of fair use to U.S. technology companies); see also ALRC FINAL
REPORT, supra note 18, at 104-08 (discussing how fair use can assist innovation); CRC FINAL REPORT, supra
note 18, at 93 (noting that the adoption of the proposed fair use doctrine "will send important signals about the
nature of the Irish innovation ecosystem, . . . provide the Irish economy with a competitive advantage in Europe,
and ... give Irish law a leadership position in EU copyright debates").
94. See Joe Nocera, Europe's Google Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2015, at A27 (noting the use of the
term in Europe).
95. See supra Section II.A (discussing the emergent trend toward the worldwide adoption of the U.S. fair
use model).




A. Trend Toward a Paradigm Shift
1. Common Law Jurisdictions
In the past few years, jurisdictions from across the world, especially those
in the common law world, have been busy exploring or undertaking major cop-
yright reforms.97 In June 2012, Canada became the first major player in the in-
ternational copyright community to complete the reform process by adopting the
Copyright Modernization Act.98 Two years later, the United Kingdom also
adopted half a dozen regulations to facilitate the more flexible use of copyrighted
works.99 These regulations built on recommendations advanced by the Gowers
Review of Intellectual Propertyloo and the Hargreaves Review of Intellectual
Property and Growtho ("Hargreaves Review"), two highly influential reports
commissioned by the U.K. government.
In addition, the Australian Law Reform Commission ("ALRC") and the
Irish Copyright Review Committee ("CRC") have both published the final re-
ports of their copyright reform consultations.102 More recently, the Australian
Productivity Commission released an independent final report supporting the
ALRC's recommendation to introduce fair use.103 Hong Kong, a former British
colony that is now part of China, also considered two copyright amendment bills,
submitted by the Hong Kong government in June 2011104 and June 2014, respec-
tively.10
97. For reports on consultations that have been undertaken worldwide to examine the copyright system
and to advance law and policy recommendations, see generally ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18 (Australia);
U.S. GREEN PAPER, supra note 22; CRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18 (Ireland); DIRECTORATE GENERAL
INTERNAL MARKET & SERVS., EUROPEAN COMM'N, REPORT ON THE RESPONSES TO THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION
ON THE REVIEW OF THE EU COPYRIGHT RULES (2014) (European Union); ANDREw GOWERS, GOWERS REvIEW
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2006) (United Kingdom); HARGREAVES, supra note 21 (United Kingdom); U.S.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 22 (United States).
98. Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2011, c. 22 (Can.).
99. In chronological order, these regulations included The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Re-
search, Education, Libraries and Archives) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/1372 (Eng.); The Copyright and Rights in
Performances (Disability) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/1384 (Eng.); The Copyright (Public Administration) Reg-
ulations 2014, SI 2014/1385 (Eng.); The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Quotation and Parody) Regula-
tions 2014, SI 2014/2356 (Eng.); The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Extended Collective Licensing)
Regulations 2014, S.I. 2014/2588 (Eng.); The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Certain Permitted Uses of
Orphan Works) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2861 (Eng.).
100. GOWERS, supra note 97.
101. HARGREAVES, supra note 21.
102. ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18; CRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18.
103. See PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, No. 78, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ARRANGEMENTS: PRODUCTtVITY
COMMISSION INQUIRY REPORT 184-85 (2016) (Austl.) ("[T]here are firm grounds now, and even stronger
grounds looking to the future, for amending the Copyright Act to replace Australia's current exceptions with a
broader fair use exception.").
104. The Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2011 (H.K.), http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrlO-1I/english/bills/b2
01106033.pdf.
105. The Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2014 (H.K.), http://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/201418
24/es32014182421.pdf [hereinafter 2014 Bill].
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One area that has garnered considerable attention-or controversy, depend-
ing on one's perspective-in all of these reform or consultation efforts concerns
the limitations and exceptions in the copyright system.106 To strengthen these
limitations and exceptions, policy-makers and commentators have called for the
introduction of a broad fair use standard, similar to the one found in the United
States.107 Indeed, the U.S. model has been particularly attractive to those juris-
dictions that have already introduced fair dealing.'08 As shown in the previous
Parts, both models aim to provide flexibility within the copyright regime even
though the fair dealing regime calls for the development of a closed system of
copyright limitations and exceptions while the fair use regime facilitates the de-
velopment of an open system. 109
In Australia, the ALRC recommended the introduction of a fair use excep-
tion,' 10 similar to what is available in the United States."' The proposed excep-
tion will include not only the fairness factors that have already been codified in
the American statute, but also a nonexhaustive list of eleven illustrative purposes,
such as those covered by existing fair dealing exceptions.1 12 Should the fair use
proposal be rejected, the ALRC also advanced a backup proposal calling for an
expansion of the existing fair dealing exceptions.''3
In September 2016, the ALRC's fair use proposal earned the support of the
Australian Productivity Commission, which undertook its own evaluation.114 As
the Commission declared:
106. See generally COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS (Ruth L. Okediji ed.,
2017) [hereinafter AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS] (collecting articles that discuss the limitations and
exceptions in the copyright system); P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT: FINAL REPORT (2008) (explor-
ing the benefits and feasibility of the development of a multilateral instrument on limitations and exceptions to
copyright).
107. See Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants, supra note 17, at 3-10 (discussing the efforts on the part
of Australia, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Liberia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka,
and Taiwan to transplant fair use).
108. See ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 93-94 (discussing how the fair use proposal in Australia
builds on the country's fair dealing tradition).
109. See supra Sections II.C and II.D (discussing the fair dealing and fair use regimes).
110. See ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 123 ("The ALRC recommends a fair use exception with
a non-exhaustive list of four fairness factors to be considered in assessing whether use of another's copyright
material is fair and a non-exhaustive list of eleven illustrative purposes.").
111. See id. ("The structure and interpretation of s 107 of the United States Copyright Act 1976 provides
an appropriate model for an Australian fair use exception, in providing a broad, flexible standard based on fair-
ness factors.").
112. See id. at 144 ("The fair use exception should contain a non-exhaustive list of illustrative uses or pur-
poses.. . . The ALRC's recommended list of illustrative purposes would be specifically Australian, but has par-
allels to those listed in other jurisdictions' statutes."); id. at 149 ("The ALRC recommends eleven illustrative
purposes.").
113. See id. at 161 (recommending the introduction of "a 'new fair dealing exception' that consolidates the
existing fair dealing exceptions in the Copyright Act and introduces new purposes . .. if fair use is not enacted").
114. See PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, supra note 103, at 9 ("Australia's narrow purpose-based exceptions
should be replaced with a principles-based, fair use exception, similar to the well-established system operating
in the US and other countries."); id. at 33 (advancing Recommendation 6.1 that "[t]he Australian Government
should accept and implement the Australian Law Reform Commission's final recommendations regarding a fair
use exception in Australia").
The Commission considers there are firm grounds now, and even stronger
grounds looking to the future, for amending the Copyright Act to replace
Australia's current exceptions with a broader fair use exception. The key
policy question for Government should be how to design exceptions that
maximise the net benefit to the community.
Importantly, fair use would not replace payment for copyright works
that are commercially available to users, but reinforces that user interests
should also be recognised by Australia's copyright system. Adopting fair
use would benefit follow on creators and innovators, Australian consum-
ers, schools, other education institutions, libraries and archives.'15
Like Australia, Ireland has been eager to broaden its copyright limitations
and exceptions. In its report providing a wholesale examination of the copyright
system, the CRC called for the introduction of a meticulously drafted fair use
exception as Section 49A of the Irish Copyright and Related Rights Act."' The
proposed provision calls on courts to consider eight nonexhaustive factors.'17 To
show its commitment to innovation, the CRC further proposed a "tightly-drafted
and balanced exception for innovation." 18 Proposed as Section 106E of the Irish
Copyright and Related Rights Act, this novel provision is drafted based on the
Committee's recommendation that "it should not be an infringement of copyright
to derive an original work which either substantially differs from, or substantially
transforms, the initial work."'19 Although this provision does not yet have a par-
allel in the United States or other parts of the world, it is arguably similar to the
copyright exception for noncommercial user-generated content in Section 29.21
115. Id at 184-85.
116. See CRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 93-94.
117. See id. at 11 (recommending that "the question of whether a use is fair on any given set of facts turns
on the application of up to eight separate factors"). These eight factors are as follows:
(a) the extent to which the use in question is analogically similar or related to the other acts permitted by
this Part,
(b) the purpose and character of the use in question, including in particular whether
(i) it is incidental, non-commercial, non-consumptive, personal or transformative in nature, or
(ii) if the use were not a fair use within the meaning of the section, it would otherwise have constituted a
secondary infringement of the right conferred by this Part.
(c) the nature of the work, including in particular whether there is a public benefit or interest in its dissem-
ination through the use in question,
(d) the amount and substantiality of the portion used, quantitatively and qualitatively, in relation to the work
as a whole,
(e) the impact of the use upon the normal commercial exploitation of the work, having regard to matters
such as its age, value and potential market,
(f) the possibility of obtaining the work, or sufficient rights therein, within a reasonable time at an ordinary
commercial price, such that the use in question is not necessary in all the circumstances of the case,
(g) whether the legitimate interests of the owner of the rights in the work are unreasonably prejudiced by
the use in question, and
(h) whether the use in question is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement, unless to do so would be
unreasonable or inappropriate or impossible for reasons of practicality or otherwise.
Id. at 94.
118. Id at 73. Section 106E(1) provides, "[i]t is not an infringement of the rights conferred by this Part [of
the Irish Copyright and Related Rights Act] if the owner or lawful user of a work (the initial work) derives from
it an innovative work." Id.
119. Id. at 10.
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of the Canadian Copyright Modernization Actl 20 and a more limited version of
the U.S. transformative use doctrine.121
Like Australia and Ireland, Hong Kong introduced a fair use proposal dur-
ing its latest round of copyright reform.12 2 Because the copyright amendment bill
advanced by the government in June 2014 did not include sufficient limitations
and exceptions to address the needs and concerns of Internet users,1
23 a fair use
proposal was introduced as a committee stage amendment alongside two other
amendments-one on the copyright exception for predominantly noncommercial
user-generated content and a provision to prevent copyright holders from con-
tracting out of the fair dealing exceptions.124 Although the fair use proposal in-
cluded statutory language that was taken verbatim from the U.S. fair use provi-
sion,12 5 that proposal was designed to supplement, not replace, the existing or
120. Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20, § 29.21 (Can.). For discussions of this provision, see
generally infra Subsection IV.B. 1; Teresa Scassa, Acknowledging Copyright's Illegitimate Offspring: User-Gen-
erated Content and Canadian Copyright Law, in COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY, supra note 19, at 431; Yu, Canadian
UGC Exception, supra note 3.
121. The transformative use doctrine originated in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-
85 (1994). Before Campbell, distinguished appellate judge Pierre Leval outlined this doctrine in a highly influ-
ential article:
I believe the answer to the question of justification turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the
challenged use is transformative. The use must be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a dif-
ferent manner or for a different purpose from the original. A quotation of copyrighted material that merely
repackages or republishes the original is unlikely to pass the test; in Justice Story's words, it would merely
"supersede the objects" of the original. If, on the other hand, the secondary use adds value to the original-
if the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics,
new insights and understandings-this is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect
for the enrichment of society.
Transformative uses may include criticizing the quoted work, exposing the character of the original
author, proving a fact, or summarizing an idea argued in the original in order to defend or rebut it. They
also may include parody, symbolism, aesthetic declarations, and innumerable other uses.
Leval, supra note 85, at 1111.
122. For the Author's discussions of copyright reform in Hong Kong, see generally Yu, Canadian UGC
Exception, supra note 3; Peter K. Yu, The Confuzzling Rhetoric Against New Copyright Exceptions, in I KRITIKA:
ESSAYS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 278 (Peter Drahos et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter Yu, Confuzzling Rhetoric];
Yu, Digital Copyright Reform, supra note 3; Yu, Quest for User-Friendly Copyright, supra note 74, at 327.
123. As the specific committee for the copyright amendment bill stated:
The Bills Committee notes the view of some deputations that the proposed copyright exceptions under the
2014 Bill would not provide adequate protection for users of copyright works who are engaged in online
dissemination of user-generated content ... such as altered pictures/videos, mash-up works, video clips of
cover versions of songs or songs with rewritten lyrics, fan-made videos and streaming of video game play-
ing, etc.
BILLS COMMITTEE'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 23.
124. See BILLS COMMITTEE'S AMENDMENTS, supra note 18 (providing the text of these proposals); see also
Yu, Quest for User-Friendly Copyright, supra note 74, at 301-19 (discussing the proposal for a copyright excep-
tion for predominantly noncommercial user-generated content).
125. Compare BILLS COMMITEE'S AMENDMENTS, supra note 18, at 4, with 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). The
proposed amendment reads as follows:
39B. Fair use
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 22, 89, 92 and 96, the fair use of a copyright work, including
such use by reproduction or distribution in copies or communication by any other means, for purposes such
as criticism, review, quotation, reporting and commenting on current events, parody, satire, caricature, pas-
tiche, education (including multiple copies for educational establishment use), scholarship, or research, is
not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factors to be considered must include-
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newly proposed fair dealing provisions.126 Sadly, this promising proposal, along
with the two other amendment proposals, died when the bill lapsed at the end of
the legislative term in July 2016.127
Even in the United Kingdom-the birthplace of the old fair dealing para-
digml28-the Hargreaves Review extolled the benefits of fair use and described
it as "the big once and for all fix of the UK." 1 2 9 Despite these benefits, the Review
refrained from recommending the introduction of fair use because "importing [it]
wholesale was unlikely to be legally feasible in Europe.""'o It will be interesting
to see if the United Kingdom will finally introduce fair use following Brexit.13'
Regardless of this possibility and the reservation expressed in the Hargreaves
Review, it is worth recalling that the earlier Gowers Review proposed a solution
that would have addressed the concern raised by the Hargreaves Review.132 Rec-
ommendation 11 of the Gowers Review specifically called for amending Article
5 of the EU Information Society Directive 13 "to allow for an exception for cre-
ative, transformative or derivative works, within the parameters of the Berne
Three Step Test."1 34
(a) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
non-profit-making purposes;
(b) the nature of the copyright work;
(c) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyright work as a whole; and
(d) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyright work.
The fact that a work is unpublished must not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon
consideration of all the above factors.
BILLS COMMITTEE'S AMENDMENTS, supra note 18, at 4.
126. As I noted in an earlier article:
Although this amendment sought to introduce fair use into Hong Kong, it did not call for either the repeal
of the existing fair dealing provisions or the replacement of those new ones proposed in the 2014 Bill.
Instead, it supplemented all of these provisions by adding an open-ended, catch-all provision-something
different from Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act.
Yu, Quest for User-Friendly Copyright, supra note 74, at 296.
127. Id. at 285.
128. See infra Section I.C (discussing this paradigm).
129. HARGREAVES, supra note 21, at 52.
130. Id. at 5; see also Directive 2001/29, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on
the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society art. 5, 2001
O.J. (L 167) 10, 16-17 [hereinafter EU InfoSoc Directive] (providing an exhaustive list of limitations and excep-
tions). The CRC, however, disagreed:
There is scope under EU law for member states to adopt a fair use doctrine as a matter of national law, and
that EUCD [EU Copyright Directive] does not necessarily preclude it (not least because, in our view, EUCD
has not harmonized the adaptation right). In particular,. . . while EU law accords a high protection to intel-
lectual property rights such as copyright under the EUCD, case law in both the [Court of Justice of the
European Union] and the [European Court of Human Rights] is increasingly stressing that these rights must
be balanced against the protection of other fundamental rights. Our tentative draft fair use exception was an
attempt to weigh up these issues and achieve an appropriate balance consistent with general principles of
EU law.
CRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 91.
131. See Steven Erlanger, Britain Votes to Leave E. U.; Cameron Plans to Step Down, N.Y. TIMES (June 24,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/world/europe/britain-brexit-european-union-referendum.html (re-
porting the Brexit vote).
132. See HARGREAVES, supra note 21, at 5 (expressing skepticism about the legal feasibility of importing
fair use wholesale into the United Kingdom).
133. See EU InfoSoc Directive, supra note 130, art. 5 (providing for copyright limitations and exceptions).
134. GOwERS, supra note 97, at 68.
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2. Civil Law Jurisdictions
Thus far, this Section has discussed only developments in common law ju-
risdictions. Civil law jurisdictions, however, have an equally strong interest in
introducing an open list of copyright limitations and exceptions. A notable ex-
ample is China. In its latest draft of the Third Amendment to the Chinese Copy-
right Law, the proposed Article 43 calls for the addition of a new category of
"other circumstances" at the end of the enumerated list of circumstances in which
a copyrighted work may be used without authorization or remuneration.
1 35 This
proposed provision will replace Article 22 of the current statute, which includes
twelve permissible circumstances, covering activities such as personal study, re-
search, or appreciation; news reporting; and classroom teaching or scientific re-
search.136
The addition of the open-ended category of "other circumstances" is highly
important because it will transform the list of permissible circumstances from a
closed list to an open one.137 More importantly, because China is a civil law
country, such addition will pave the way for similar reforms in other civil law
jurisdictions.13 8 Within Asia, South Korea1 39 and Taiwan,
140 both civil law juris-
dictions, have already adopted fair use. In Japan, another civil law jurisdiction,
the debate on the introduction of fair use has been on and off in the past decade.
14 1
Even in continental Europe, which has hitherto shown a vocal and persis-
tent resistance to the introduction of an open list of copyright limitations and
135. See Copyright Law of People's Republic of China (Third Revised Draft), art. 43(13) (2014), im-
ages.chinalaw.gov.cn/www/201406/201406061356
0 05 4.doc (in Chinese).
136. See Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'1
People's Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended Oct. 27, 2001, effective Oct. 27, 2001), art. 22(1-12) (providing an
enumerated list of circumstances in which a copyrighted work may be used without authorization or remunera-
tion).
137. See Third Revised Draft, supra note 135, art. 43(13) (adding a new category of "other circumstances"
to the enumerated list of circumstances in which a copyrighted work may be used without authorization or remu-
neration).
138. See Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants, supra note 17, at 10.
139. Copyright Act, Act No. 432, Jan. 28, 1957, amended by Act No. 14,083, Mar. 22, 2016, art. 35-3 (S.
Kor.), translated in Korea Copyright Commission, https://www.copyright.or.kr/eng/laws-and-treaties/copyright-
law/chapter02/sectionO4.do (last visited Nov. 10, 2018); see also Sang Jo Jong, Fair Use in Korea,
INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Feb. 27, 2017), http://infojustice.org/archives/37819 (offering a brief discussion of the origin
and operation of the fair use provision in South Korea).
140. Copyright Act 2016 art. 65, translated in Intellectual Property Office, https://www.tipo.gov.tw/pub-
lic/data/6122102727 1.pdf (Taiwan).
141. See Yoshiyuki Tamura, Rethinking the Copyright Institution for the Digital Age, 1 WIPO J. 63, 70
(2009) (noting that "the division of roles between the legislature and the judiciary through a distinction between
rules and standards . .. has lately been raised by arguments in support of the introduction of a fair use clause in
the Japanese copyright law"); Tatsuhiro Ueno, Rethinking the Provisions on Limitations ofRights in the Japanese
Copyright Act-Toward a Japanese-Style "Fair Use" Clause, 34 AIPPI J. 159 (2009) (examining the possibility
of adding a "general saving clause" to the end of the existing provisions on limitations of rights in Japanese
copyright law).
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exceptions,142 a growing number of European commentators have advanced pro-
posals on how the copyright system in the region can be adjusted to accommo-
date such a list. For instance, Marie-Christine Janssens declared:
[T]he choice of a closed list should be abandoned and such a list should be
replaced by a more flexible system that will allow a more rapid response to
new business models, novel uses or urgent situations that will continue to
arise, undoubtedly, in the dynamic information society.... I would pro-
pose a system that combines a list of mandatory exceptions, some of which
are given imperative character, with an exhaustive list of optional provi-
sions coupled to a "window provision." 43
In addition, Martin Senftleben discussed how to expand copyright limitations
and exceptions by reinterpreting the three-step test used in the TRIPS Agree-
ment'" and the WIPO Copyright Treaty.14 5 As he observed:
[T]he time seems ripe to turn to a productive use of the three-step test. In-
stead of employing the test as a straitjacket of copyright limitations, mod-
em copyright legislation should seek to encourage its use as are fined pro-
portionality test that allows both the restriction and the broadening of
limitations in accordance with the individual circumstances of a given
case.146
He and Bernt Hugenholtz further advanced recommendations to "introduce a
measure of flexibility alongside the existing structure of limitations and excep-
tions, and thus combine the advantages of enhanced flexibility with legal security
and technological neutrality." 47
In July 2008, the Max Planck Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of
the "Three-Step Test" in Copyright Law was adopted in Munich, Germany to
142. See Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 115-
21 (2000) [hereinafter Okediji, International Fair Use Doctrine] (discussing the requests for clarification of the
fair use doctrine within the framework of the TRIPS Council Review of Legislation).
143. Marie-Christine Janssens, The Issue of Exceptions: Reshaping the K ys to the Gates in the Territory
of Literary, Musical and Artistic Creation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE OF EU COPYRIGHT 317,
337 (Estelle Derclaye ed., 2009) (footnotes omitted).
144. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 13 ("Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to
exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.").
145. Article 10(1) of the WIPO Copyright Treaty provides:
Contracting Parties may, in their national legislation, provide for limitations of or exceptions to the rights
granted to authors of literary and artistic works under this Treaty in certain special cases that do not conflict
with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author.
WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 10(1), Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997) [hereinafter WCT].
146. Martin Senftleben, Fair Use in the Netherlands-A Renaissance?, 33 TUDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS,
MEDIA EN INFORMATIERECHT [J. FOR AuTHoRs, MEDIA & INFO. L.] 1, 7 (2009) (Neth.) (footnote omitted); see
also Martin Senftleben, The International Three-Step Test: A Model Provision for EC Fair Use Legislation, 1 J.
INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 67, 76 (2010) ("[A]n EC fair use doctrine can be established
on the basis of the three-step test embodied in Article 5(5) of the Copyright Directive."); Martin Senftleben, The
Perfect Match: Civil Law Judges and Open-Ended Fair Use Provisions, 33 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 231 (2017)
(dispelling the myth that civil law judges cannot adequately and consistently apply open-ended fair use norms).
147. Bernt Hugenholtz & Martin R.F. Senftlecben, Fair Use in Europe. In Search ofFlexibilities 2 (Institute
for Information Law, University of Amsterdam, Research Paper No. 2012-33, 2012), https://ssm.com/ab-
stract-2013239.
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advance a new interpretation of the three-step test to support "open ended limi-
tations and exceptions, so long as the scope of such limitations and exceptions is
reasonably foreseeable."1 48 The Wittem Group,149 a collective of distinguished
European copyright scholars, also developed the model European Copyright
Code. This code included Article 5.5, which Jonathan Griffiths described as "an
open 'meta-exception."'I0 Entitling "further limitations," this provision states:
Any other use that is comparable to the uses enumerated ... is permitted
provided that the corresponding requirements of the relevant limitation are
met and the use does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work
and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author
or rightholder, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.1
5 '
Finally, at the international level, the Global Network on Copyright Users'
Rights,15 2 a network of copyright scholars from different parts of the world,
drafted a model flexible copyright exception to help countries update their cop-
yright systems in response to rapid economic, social, cultural, and technological
148. MAX PLANCK INST. FOR INTELLECTUAL PROP. & COMPETITION LAW, DECLARATION ON A BALANCED
INTERPRETATION OF THE "THREE-STEP TEST" IN COPYRIGHT LAW I 3(a) (2008), https://www.ip.mpg.de/filead-
min/ipmpg/content/forschung aktuell/01_balanced/declaration three step test fmalenglishl.pdf [hereinafter
MAX PLANCK DECLARATION]; see also Monika Ermert, IP Experts Sign Declaration Seeking Balanced Copy-
right Three-Step Test, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (July 24, 2008), https://www.ip-watch.org/2008/07/24/ip-experts-
sign-declaration-against-unbalanced-copyright-three-step-test/ (reporting the adoption of the declaration).
149. As Bernt Hugenholtz, a leader of the Wittem Project and a member of the drafting committee of the
Wittem Code, explained:
From 2002 to 2010, a group of European scholars united in the "Wittem Group" collaborated on drafting
model provisions of a European Copyright Code. The members of the Wittem Group share a concem that
the process of copyright law-making at the European level lacks transparency and that the voice of academia
too often remains unheard. The Group believes that a European Copyright Code drafted by legal scholars
might serve as a model or reference tool for future harmonization or unification of copyright at the European
level. Published in April 2010, the Code provides model provisions on the core elements of any copyright
law: subject matter of copyright, authorship and ownership, moral rights, economic rights and limitations.
Bernt Hugenholtz, The Wittem Group's European Copyright Code, in CODIFICATION OF EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT
LAW: CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES 339, 339 (Tatiana-Eleni Synodinou ed., 2012) (footnote omitted).
150. Jonathan Griffiths, Unsticking the Centre-Piece-The Liberation ofEuropean Copyright Law?, 1 J.
INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. 87, 89 (2010).
151. THE WITTEM PROJECT, EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT CODE art. 5.5 (2010). As Professor Hugenholtz ex-
plained:
Article 5.5 extends the scope of the itemized limitations by permitting other uses that are "comparable to"
the uses mentioned in Articles 5.1 through 5.4, subject to the operation of the three-step test. [Articles 5.1
to 5.4 cover, respectively, uses with minimal economic significance, uses for the purpose of freedom of
expression and information, uses permitted to promote social, political and cultural objectives, and uses for
the purpose of enhancing competition.] This half-open structure of copyright limitations is perhaps the most
innovative aspect of the entire Wittem Code. It combines the advantage of legal security and predictability
associated with the "closed list" approach of limitations and exceptions under the author's right tradition
with the flexibility and adaptability to technological change of the American fair use doctrine. Adding to
this flexibility is the way the limitations are shaped; exempted uses are not defined with direct reference to
economic rights (e.g., right of reproduction or right of communication to the public), but actually refer to
uses. As a consequence, a limitation may on occasion exempt acts that affect multiple economic rights
concurrently.
Hugenholtz, supra note 149, at 349-50 (footnotes omitted). Notably, the code "does not allow new limitations
by blending the criteria of articles 5.1 to 5.3." THE WITrEM PROJECT, supra, art. 5.5 n.55.
152. See generally Global Network on Copyright Users' Rights, INFOJUSTICE.ORG, http://infojustice.
org/flexible-use (last visited Nov. 10, 2018) (providing information about this network). The Author is a founding
member of this network.
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change.'53 Notably, the scholars involved come from both common law and civil
law jurisdictions.15 4 The network's membership therefore signals the possibility
for developing a global paradigm with built-in flexibilities that suit different
types of jurisdictions.
3. Summary
Regardless of whether the jurisdiction has a common law or civil law tra-
dition, there have been quite a number of important and exciting developments
concerning the efforts to introduce fair use into the copyright system. If we com-
bine all of these developments with those concerning jurisdictions that have al-
ready adopted a fair use regime or its close variants-namely, Israel, Liberia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan 5 5 -
one may notice an emergent trend toward the worldwide adoption of fair use.
This trend is particularly important considering that more than forty jurisdictions
"in all regions of the world and at all levels of development" have already
adopted either the fair dealing or fair use model.156 If more of these jurisdictions
were making a switch from fair dealing to fair use, the latter would likely affect
at least a sizeable portion of the world's population. This switch, in turn, would
spark a paradigm shift in international copyright norms.
B. Countertrend Toward the Retention of the Status Quo
Although it is tempting to claim the existence of an emergent trend toward
the worldwide adoption of fair use and a slowly emerging paradigm shift in in-
ternational copyright norms, a close scrutiny of the actual developments on the
ground does not support this claim. There is an undeniable trend toward the in-
troduction of an open list of copyright limitations and exceptions.'5 7 Neverthe-
less, those jurisdictions that helped set this trend did not adopt the U.S. fair use
model.1'8 Instead, they retained, or proposed to retain, a considerable part of the
status quo.1 59 A hybrid model emerged as a result.
To illustrate how these jurisdictions have introduced fair use while retain-
ing part of the status quo, consider again the "fair use" proposals explored in the
153. See Global Network on Copyright Users' Rights, Model Flexible Copyright Exception 4.0 (2012),
http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Model-Flexible-Copyright-Exception-Version-4.0.pdf
(providing the exception).
154. See Global Network on Copyright Users' Rights, supra note 152 (providing a list of Global Expert
Network Founding Members).
155. See BAND& GERAFI, supra note 17, at 30,35-38,46,55-57, 60-62, 64 (listing the fair use provisions
in Israel, Liberia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan); see also Yu, Cus-
tomizing Fair Use Transplants, supra note 17, at 3-10 (discussing the efforts on the part of these jurisdictions to
transplant fair use).
156. BAND &GERAFI, supra note 17, at 1.
157. See id at 2 ("In recent years, the copyright law developments across the world have shown a growing
willingness on the part of both developed and developing countries to adopt fair use or its close variants.").
158. See id. at 6-10 (discussing those jurisdictions that transplanted, or sought to transplant, fair use without
introducing a verbatim or substantially verbatim transplant).
159. See id
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previous Section-namely, those advanced in Australia, Ireland, and Hong
Kong. 160 In Australia, even though the ALRC called for the introduction of an
open-ended fair use exception, its final report recommended the creation of a
nonexhaustive list of illustrative purposes.16 1 This list includes the following pur-
poses:
(a) research or study;
(b) criticism or review;




(g) non-commercial private use;
(h) incidental or technical use;
(i) library or archive use;
(j) education; and
(k) access for people with disability.16 2
The ALRC's final report further recommended the continued codification
of the fairness factors,163 thereby expanding the use of these factors beyond the
purpose of research or study.16 With respect to the latter, the current Australian
copyright law allows courts to consider the following factors in determining
whether a dealing with a copyrighted work is fair:
(a) the purpose and character of the dealing;
(b) the nature of the work or adaptation;
(c) the possibility of obtaining the work or adaptation within a reasonable
time at an ordinary commercial price;
(d) the effect of the dealing upon the potential market for, or value of, the
work or adaptation; and
(e) in a case where only part of the work or adaptation is reproduced-the
amount and substantiality of the part copied taken in relation to the whole
work or adaptation.'65
Four of these factors are substantially similar to the U.S. fair use factors.1" The
third one, however, is not included in the U.S. statute, although courts have con-
160. See sources cited supra note 18.
161. See ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 150-51 (providing Recommendation 5-3).
162. Id.
163. See id at 144 (providing Recommendation 5-2).
164. See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 40 (Austl.) (providing the fair dealing exception for the purpose of
research or study).
165. Id
166. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018) (listing the four nonexhaustive fair use factors).
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sidered it in cases such as Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter-
prises,167 Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc.,'
68
and American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc. 169 For its recommendation, the
ALRC has chosen only those four factors that have been included in the U.S. fair
use provision.'7 0
In addition to the fairness factors, the Commission's proposal called for the
establishment of a nonexhaustive list of illustrative purposes.71 As the ALRC
explained, there are good reasons to combine the fairness factors with this non-
exhaustive list:
Professor Kathy Bowrey considered that the fairness factors and illustrative
purposes would be mutually supportive: "The former primarily serve to
better elucidate motivational factors related to the creation of the defend-
ant's work and allow for critical reflection on the significance of that evi-
dence, in view of current cultural and economic practices. The non-exhaus-
tive list of illustrative purposes document established cultural practices that
might generally be indicative of fair use, where the fairness factors are also
met."
In her view, the advantage of this approach is that, by separating out
the fairness factors from the illustrative purposes, it is "easier for the public
to identify the normative factors they need to consider to determine the
legitimacy of their use, re ardless of any idiosyncrasies associated with
their individual practice."
167. 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) ("The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive
of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material
without paying the customary price.").
168. 99 F.3d 1381, 1403 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[The significant question in the first factor's inquiry into the
purpose and character of the use is whether the copyrighted material is being exploited for profit without paying
the customary price.").
169. As Chief Judge Jon Newman declared:
[I]t is not unsound to conclude that the right to seek payment for a particular use tends to become legally
cognizable under the fourth fair use factor when the means for paying for such a use is made easier.... [I]t
is sensible that a particular unauthorized use should be considered "more fair" when there is no ready market
or means to pay for the use, while such an unauthorized use should be considered "less fair" when there is
a ready market or means to pay for the use.
60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1994).
170. See ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 141-43 (explaining why the ALRC has decided against
including the factor concerning "the possibility of obtaining the work or adaptation within a reasonable time at
an ordinary commercial price"). Judge Pierre Leval concurred:
Th[e] test [regarding "whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without
paying the customary price"] is circular. Whether there is a "customary price" depends, of course, on
whether the secondary use is a fair use or an infringement. Measuring the hypothetically lost royalties serves
no purpose unless we have learned from other factors whether the copyright owner was entitled to charge
for the use.
Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449, 1460 (1997).
171. See ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 124 (including in the exception three elements: (1) "an
express statement hat a fair use of another's copyright material does not infringe copyright"; (2) "a non-exhaus-
tive list of four fairness factors to be considered in determining whether use of that copyright material is fair";
and (3) "a non-exhaustive list of illustrative uses or purposes").
172. Id
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Another illustration is Ireland. Even though the CRC pushed for the adop-
tion of an open-ended fair use regime, its recommendation supplements that new
regime with preexisting fair dealing provisions.1 7 3 Unlike the fair use provision
in the United States or the one recommended by the ALRC, the proposed Section
49A(2) of the Irish Copyright and Related Rights Act includes the following lan-
guage: "The other acts permitted by this Part shall be regarded as examples of
fair use, and, in any particular case, the court shall not consider whether a use
constitutes a fair use without first considering whether that use amounts to an-
other act permitted by this Part."l74
Based on this unique language, the CRC, in effect, proposed a regime that
allows fair use to cover unforeseen circumstances but requires courts to first con-
sider whether the statute includes an exception that already covers the implicated
use of a copyrighted work.'7 5 As the Committee explained:
The Report acknowledges that fair use is a controversial topic, with pow-
erful views expressed both for and against it. It does not recommend the
introduction of . . . "the US style 'fair use' doctrine" which it considered
under its terms of reference, but rather a specifically Irish version.
It recommends the introduction of a new [Copyright and Related
Rights Act] section allowing for fair use, but tying it very closely to exist-
ing exceptions and making it clear that these exceptions should be ex-
hausted before any claim to fair use should be considered. The exceptions
should be regarded as examples of fair use so as to allow workable analo-
gies to be developed[] and sets out the criteria for the court to take into
account in determining whether or not a matter amounts to fair use.17 6
A third illustration is Hong Kong. While the proposed amendment o the
Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2014 added a U.S.-style fair use provision to the
existing list of limitations and exceptions,1 7 that provision did not intend to re-
place the existing fair dealing provisions in the Hong Kong Copyright Ordi-
nance-those covering research and private study; criticism, review, and news
reporting; giving or receiving instruction; and public administration.s78 The new
fair use provision would also not prejudice the three new fair dealing provisions
introduced through the copyright amendment bill-those covering quotation;
commenting on current events; and parody, satire, caricature, and pastiche.17 9
173. See CRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 93-94.
174. Id. at 93.
175. See id
176. Id. at 176-77.
177. See BILLS CoMMITTEE'S AMENDMENTS, supra note 18, at 4 (providing the text of the fair use proposal).
178. See Hong Kong Copyright Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 528, § 38 (H.K.) (research and private study); id
§ 39 (criticism, review, and news reporting); id § 41A (giving or receiving instruction); id § 54A (public ad-
ministration).
179. See 2014 Bill, supra note 105, at C2989 (amending Section 39 of the Hong Kong Copyright Ordinance
by introducing new copyright exceptions for quotation and for commenting on current events); id at C2993
(adding a new Section 39A to create a copyright exception for parody, satire, caricature, and pastiche).
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Instead, the provision would serve mostly as a general saving clause or a supple-
mental catch-all provision.180
In sum, although a number of jurisdictions have been actively pushing for
the introduction of fair use into their copyright systems, they have made a con-
scious choice to retain a considerable part of the status quo, including preexisting
fair dealing arrangements. These jurisdictions therefore did not shift the para-
digm, but rather facilitated its evolution.
The preferences of these jurisdictions are understandable considering that
policy-makers and legislators tend to be reluctant to introduce wholesale changes
that would disrupt the preexisting legal system, especially in an area that is so
intertwined with business, technology, and society.181 Nevertheless, the jurisdic-
tions' continued and express preferences for a hybrid model have casted serious
doubt about the existence of an emergent trend toward the worldwide adoption
of fair use and a slowly emerging paradigm shift in international copyright
norms.182 The lack of such a trend invites us to explore what it means to have a
paradigm evolution, as opposed to a paradigm shift. It also provokes us to think
more deeply about not only the efforts to reform copyright limitations and ex-
ceptions based on the U.S. fair use model, but also the expediency, effectiveness,
and sustainability of global law reform in the American image.
IV. PRIMARY CAUSES
Part III has shown that, despite the eagerness of many jurisdictions to in-
troduce the fair use model, these jurisdictions made a conscious choice to retain
a considerable part of the status quo-either by incorporating preexisting copy-
right limitations and exceptions into the new fair use regime or by transforming
the regime with an added list of illustrative purposes. In light of this conscious
choice, one cannot help but wonder why policy-makers and legislators have pre-
ferred a paradigm evolution to a paradigm shift. After all, it is these people who
perceived the crisis early and called for a paradigm shift in the first place.18 3
Although there are many possible contributing factors within and outside
the legal system, this Part focuses on factors residing within. Specifically, this
Part examines factors relating to intellectual property law, international and com-
parative law, and the legislative process. This Part underscores the inherent dif-
ficulty in pinpointing the primary causes behind a paradigm shift, especially un-
der the punctuated equilibrium model when there is no easy way to predict when
180. See Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants, supra note 17, at 9-10 (discussing the introduction of a
general saving clause or a supplemental catch-all provision as a modality of transplantation); Yu, Quest for User-
Friendly Copyright, supra note 74, at 327-30 (discussing the difference between a standalone fair use provision
and a supplemental catch-all fair use provision).
181. See infra text accompanying notes 253-55 (discussing legislative inertia).
182. See sources cited supra note 18.
183. See, e.g., GOWERS, supra note 97, at 68 (calling for an amendment o the EU Information Society
Directive to provide for "an exception for creative, transformative or derivative works"); HARGREAVES, supra
note 21, at 52 (calling for the introduction of fair use as "the big once and for all fix of the UK").
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that equilibrium will be reached.184 This Part also points out that, even when we
single out causes within the legal system, contributing factors can come from
many directions.185 As the intellectual property system continues to expand-at
both the domestic and global levels-this system will likely implicate many
other areas of the law.1 86
A. Intellectual Property Law
To begin this inquiry, it is important to fully evaluate the U.S. fair use
model, which provides many jurisdictions with a new paradigm for developing
new international copyright norms. In its systematic comparison between the fair
dealing and fair use models-the old and new paradigms for the purposes of this
Article-the ALRC's final report provided a careful evaluation of their respec-
tive strengths and weaknesses.187
To build the case for fair use, this report identified the following strengths:
* Fair use is flexible and technology-neutral.
* Fair use promotes public interest and transformative uses.
* Fair use assists innovation.
* Fair use better aligns with reasonable consumer expectations.
* Fair use helps protect rights holders' markets.
* Fair use is sufficiently certain and predictable.
* Fair use is compatible with moral rights and international law. 88
Although the ALRC was eager to emphasize the strengths of the fair use
model and ended up recommending the model's adoption, its final report and the
preceding discussion paper devoted considerable analysis to the model's contin-
uous criticisms and related policy concerns.'89 Specifically, the report noted
some of the weaknesses identified earlier in the review process:
184. As Oona Hathaway explained:
In the punctuated equilibrium model, as in the increasing returns path dependence model, the ultimate out-
come of a process of change is usually indeterminate because punctuated equilibria are marked by "contin-
gency": "the inability of the theory to predict or explain, either deterministically or probabilistically, the
occurrence of a specific outcome."
Hathaway, supra note 43, at 615-16 (quoting Mahoney, supra note 45, at 513).
185. See discussion infra Sections IV.A (discussing intellectual property law), IV.B (discussing interna-
tional and comparative law), IV.C (discussing the legislative process).
186. See Peter K. Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST. LOuiS U. L.J. 923, 940
(2008) (noting that "the 'law and. . .' movement has finally spread to international intellectual property law, and
the subject has become increasingly multidisciplinary"). As I noted in an earlier article:
[B]ecause of the ever-expanding scope of intellectual property rights and the ability for these rights to spill
over into other areas of international regulation, intellectual property training and educational programs
should feature inter- and multi-disciplinary perspectives. Many of the existing programs focus primarily on
the legal aspects of intellectual property. However, it is increasingly important to consider other aspects of
intellectual property, such as political, economic, social, and cultural.
Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property Training and Educationfor Development, 28 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 311, 328
(2012) (footnote omitted).
187. See ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 87-122.
188. Id. at 21.
189. See id. at 87-122; ALRC, COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGtTAL ECONOMY: DIsCusSION PAPER 59-98, 131-
54 (2013) [hereinafter ALRC DiscussioN PAPER].
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* [fair use] is unnecessary and no case is made out for it;
* [fair use] would create uncertainty and expense;
* [fair use] originated in a different legal environment; and
* [fair use] may not comply with the three-step test.1 90
The ALRC's final report is used in this Part because it is representative of
extant comparative studies on the distinctions between fair dealing and fair use.
More importantly, this comprehensive, systematic, and carefully written report
illustrates the many strengths and weaknesses of the fair use model. The model's
documented weaknesses help explain why many jurisdictions seeking to intro-
duce fair use ended up adopting a hybrid model.
After all, it is not unusual for policy-makers and legislators to push for in-
novation in the legal system while at the same time demanding the retention of
what they consider as the strengths of current law or what they perceive as an
important local tradition.19 ' By combining the strengths of both the old and new
paradigms to form a hybrid model, these policy-makers and legislators have
managed to achieve the best of both worlds.192
The eagerness to achieve such a win-win outcome is understandable con-
sidering that a hybrid model can provide many strengths of the fair use model.
Indeed, the introduction of an open list of copyright limitations and exceptions
can retain virtually all of the strengths identified by the ALRC in regard to the
fair use model.193 It does not matter much whether the model ultimately adopted
is fair use or a hybrid if the goal of this new model is to promote the public
interest, advance innovation, or meet consumer expectations. Any open model
will provide sufficient flexibility for courts and law enforcement personnel to
address unforeseen situations.'94 While a standalone fair use provision, similar
to the one found in the United States, 19 may be more efficient in resolving cop-
yright disputes in some situations, a hybrid model with an open list of copyright
limitations and exceptions can be more efficient in other situations, such as those
already covered by preexisting fair dealing exceptions.
Consider more specifically the proposals advanced by the ALRC and the
CRC. To address the criticism that fair use lacks precision and clarity,196 the
190. ALRC DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 189, at 71.
191. See Yu, Digital Copyright Reform, supra note 3, at 718-19 (discussing how the proposal for establish-
ing statutory or pre-established damages does not fit well within the Hong Kong legal tradition).
192. See Griffiths, supra note 150, at 93 (describing "a factor-based, fair use provision for Europe ... [as]
the 'best of both worlds'); Yu, Questfor User-Friendly Copyright, supra note 74, at 330 ("[C]ountries may seek
to achieve the best of both worlds by adopting a hybrid model that includes some features of fair dealing and
some features of fair use.").
193. See ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 21 (identifying the strengths of a flexible fair use excep-
tion).
194. Cf Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 147, at 2 (noting that "a semi-open norm" can be "almost as
flexible as the fair use rule of the United States").
195. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018) (codifying fair use).
196. See Yu, Quest for User-Friendly Copyright, supra note 74, at 331-34 (discussing the criticism that fair
use lacks precision and clarity).
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ALRC's proposal coupled the newly introduced fair use provision with a nonex-
haustive list of illustrative purposes.'97 Likewise, the CRC recommended the in-
clusion of all existing limitations and exceptions "as examples of fair use" and a
new requirement that courts should give priority consideration to those limita-
tions and exceptions.'98 In both jurisdictions, the proposed hybrid model man-
ages to introduce select aspects of fair use while converting the list of copyright
limitations and exceptions from a closed list to an open one.'99 Yet neither juris-
diction transplanted the fair use model verbatim or substantially verbatim from
the United States.200
Viewed against the existing negotiation literature, the compromises made
by Australian and Irish policy-makers made a lot of sense. Although these pol-
icy-makers introduced the fair use model to broaden copyright limitations and
exceptions, they were well aware of the drastically different positions taken by
different legislators and their respective constituents.2 0 1 Against this complicated
political background, the best compromise they could come up with is a hybrid
option that includes a combination of both the old and new paradigms.2 0 2
As Professors Roger Fisher and William Ury noted in their seminal work,
Getting to Yes, successful negotiators tend to create or enlarge value before di-
viding the pie.2 03 The CRC's recommendation provides an excellent illustration
of this value-creating approach.20 Instead of opting for either the retention of the
existing fair dealing regime or the introduction of a new fair use regime, the
CRC's proposal enlarges the pie by ensuring that hose who prefer the existing
fair dealing provisions, and the clarity they provide, will be no worse off. 20 5
Meanwhile, it also facilitates the creation of new limitations and exceptions that
are not previously found in the Irish Copyright and Related Rights Act.
197. See ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 123-60 (recommending the introduction of a fair use
exception).
198. See CRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 89, 93-94 (recommending the introduction of the fair use
exception as a new Section 49A of the Irish Copyright and Related Rights Act).
199. See ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 13-14 (advancing the proposal); CRC FINAL REPORT,
supra note 18, at 93-94 (advancing the proposal).
200. Compare ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 13-14 (advancing the proposal); CRC FINAL
REPORT, supra note 18, at 93-94 (advancing the proposal), with Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants, supra
note 17, at 4-6 (discussing those jurisdictions that introduced a verbatim or substantially verbatim transplant).
201. See ALRC DiscuSSION PAPER, supra note 189, at 71-79 (identifying the arguments against the intro-
duction of fair use in Australia); ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 112-13, 128 (noting the views of those
stakeholders opposing such introduction); CRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 58 (noting the "difference of
opinion, with some submissions questioning whether it would be wise to do so").
202. See ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 13-14 (advancing the proposal); CRC FINAL REPORT,
supra note 18, at 93-94 (advancing the proposal).
203. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 56-80
(2d ed. 1991) (discussing ways to "invent options for mutual gains").
204. See CRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 93-94 (advancing the proposal).
205. See id.
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B. International and Comparative Law
The second set of contributory factors concerns the legal transplant process.
Modeled after Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act, the proposals to introduce
fair use in many jurisdictions provide textbook illustrations of legal trans-
plants.206
In the intellectual property field, legal transplants are very common. Since
the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, policy-makers and commentators, espe-
cially those concerned about its unintended consequences in developing coun-
tries, have criticized the agreement for transplanting inappropriate standards that
fail to take account of local needs, national interests, technological capabilities,
institutional capacities, and public health conditions.2 07 In the past decade, these
criticisms have become even louder and more serious, due largely to the devel-
oped countries' aggressive push for the establishment of TRIPS-plus bilateral,
regional, and plurilateral agreements, such as ACTA, the TPP (now the CPTPP),
and, to some extent, the RCEP.208
As these critics rightly pointed out, hastily transplanted laws can be both
ineffective and insensitive to local conditions.20 9 These transplants can also stifle
local development while upsetting the existing local tradition.2 10 In addition, they
may bring problems from abroad, thus exacerbating the problems they seek to
206. See Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants, supra note 17, at 3-10 (discussing the different fair use
transplants from across the world).
207. See Peter K. Yu, The Comparative Economics ofInternational Intellectual Property Agreements, in
CoMPARATIvE LAW AND EcoNOMICs 282 (Theodore Eisenberg & Giovanni B. Ramello eds., 2016) (discussing
the higher standards of intellectual property protection and enforcement imposed by the TRIPS Agreement); Yu,
The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 23, at 858-62 (discussing the enclosure of the intellectual
property policy space by the TRIPS Agreement); see also Yu, TRIPs and Its Discontents, supra note 6, at 373-
75 (discussing the coercion narrative concerning the origins of the TRIPS Agreement).
208. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 23, at 855-70 (discussing the enclosure of
policy space through the introduction of the TRIPS Agreement and TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and plurilat-
eral trade agreements).
209. See ALRC DISCuSSioN PAPER, supra note 189, at 76-77 (discussing the criticism that "fair use origi-
nated in a different legal environment"). As I noted in an earlier book chapter:
A successful transplant is usually one that is sensitive to the local environment. In order for the transplanted
laws to be effective, they may need to undergo a careful evaluation and rigorous adaptation process. When
they do not undergo such a process[,] ... the effectiveness and expediency of the transplanted laws are
questionable.
Yu, Transplant and Transformation, supra note 3, at 38-39. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform, supra note 3, at 770
("[If legai transplants] are hastily adopted without careful evaluation and adaptation, they may be both ineffective
and insensitive to local conditions. They may also stifle local development while upsetting the existing local
tradition.").
210. See Yu, Digital Copyright Reform, supra note 3, at 718-19 (discussing how the proposal for establish-
ing statutory or pre-established damages does not fit well within the legal tradition in Hong Kong). See generally
Birnhack, supra note 20 (documenting the problems of partial, slightly outdated fair use transplants).
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address.211 They may even take away the valuable opportunities for experimen-
tation with new regulatory and economic policies.2 12
Nevertheless, legal transplants can be quite beneficial, especially if they are
carefully selected and appropriately customized.213 In an earlier article, I noted
the following benefits of legal transplants:
[L]egal transplantation allows countries, especially those with limited re-
sources, to take a free ride on the legislative efforts of other, usually more
economically developed, countries. The process also provides laws that
have served as time-tested solutions to similar problems, drawing on les-
sons learned from the experiences in the source countries-both positive
and negative. Transplants may even help provide preemptory defenses to
countries that face repeated and intense pressure from their more powerful
trading partners, not to mention the strong likelihood that he laws in these
powerful countries will eventually become international standards by vir-
tue of the source countries' sheer economic and political might.214
To complicate matters, the transplant of the U.S. fair use model may be
different from the transplants introduced by the TRIPS Agreement or TRIPS-
plus bilateral, regional, or plurilateral trade agreements.215 Not only is the under-
lying model very different, the ultimate objective of the transplant efforts varies
considerably. Unlike TRIPS or TRIPS-plus transplants, which push for greater
copyright protection, fair use transplants seek to enlarge the freedom of users in
the copyright system while enhancing their access to copyrighted works.216
Given the ongoing push for higher protection and enforcement standards, many
policy-makers and commentators find these transplants highly appealing.2 17
211. As I noted in an earlier book chapter:
[Liegal transplants-especially those involving controversial aws and policies-could bring to the recipi-
ent countries problems from the source countries. These tag-along problems are particularly troubling for
developing countries because they have very limited expertise in assessing the potential problems and un-
intended consequences caused by the ill-advised transplants.
Yu, Transplant and Transformation, supra note 3, at 31.
212. See John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 707-
09 (2002) (discussing how countries can develop legal systems by experimenting with new regulatory and eco-
nomic policies).
213. See Yu, Transplant and Transformation, supra note 3, at 10 (noting the potential benefits when legal
transplants "are carefully selected and appropriately customized"); Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants, supra
note 17, at 11 ("[R]egardless of whether a legal transplant is widely supported by the local populace or forced
upon them from abroad, the transplanted law needs to be customized to local conditions if it is to be effective
and if it is to receive wide public support.").
214. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform, supra note 3, at 754-55.
215. See sources cited supra note 23.
216. See ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 100-08 (discussing how fair use promotes the public
interest, facilitates transformative uses, and assists innovation).
217. See ERNST & YOUNG, COST BENEFrr ANALYSIs OF CHANGES TO THE COPYRIGHT AcT 1968, at x (2016)
("Overall, our analysis of new fair dealing suggests that the ALRC's proposed recommendations hould be ben-
eficial, albeit not substantially in some areas. From the standpoint of an 'open-ended' (fair use) or 'closed-ended'
(fair dealing) system of exceptions, the former is likely to have the largest net benefit."); Okediji, International
Fair Use Doctrine, supra note 142 (calling for the development of an international fair use doctrine).
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Some have also welcomed their potential ability to restore the balance in the
copyright system.2 18
Notwithstanding these many benefits, fair use transplants have raised sim-
ilar problems caused by TRIPS or TRIPS-plus transplants.2 19 To avoid these
problems and to ensure their appropriateness and effectiveness, fair use trans-
plants have to be customized based on local conditions.2 2 0 As the late Alan Wat-
son, father of the study of legal transplants, observed, "[t]ransplanting frequently,
perhaps always, involves legal transformation."221 Indeed, "a time of transplant
is often a moment when reforms can be introduced."222
Part of the reason why many policy-makers and legislators embraced a hy-
brid model, as opposed to the U.S. fair use model, is that they wanted to better
adapt the transplant to local conditions.223 In their view, a model that preserves a
considerable part of the status quo while introducing innovation in copyright law
is more likely to take root and become effective.224 During the copyright reform
process, it is not unusual for the copyright industries to criticize the fair, use
model for being alien to local soil.2
2 5
218. See ALRC DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 189, at 69 (discussing how fair use can restore balance to
the copyright system); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483,
1495 (2007) ("Fair use is perhaps the most crucial policy tool for maintaining copyright's intended balance.");
Samuelson, supra note 85, at 2618 ('Fair use is an essential doctrine in U.S. copyright law that counterbalances
what would otherwise be an unreasonably broad grant of rights to authors and an unduly narrow set of negotiated
exceptions and limitations.").
219. See Yu, Transplant and Transformation, supra note 3, at 29-32 (identifying the potential problems
posed by TRIPS and TRIPS-plus transplants).
220. See Kahn-Freund, supra note 3, at 24 (noting that, because transplanted laws often bring with them
foreign values, they may upset longstanding traditions in the recipient countries while at the same time under-
mining institutions that are "closely linked with the structure and organization of political power and social power
in their own environment"); Yu, Digital Copyright Reform, supra note 3, at 770 ("[If legal transplants] are hastily
adopted without careful evaluation and adaptation, they may be both ineffective and insensitive to local condi-
tions. They may also stifle local development while upsetting the existing local tradition.").
221. WATSON, supra note 3, at 116.
222. Id. at 35.
223. As I noted in an earlier article:
Because legal transplants have both strengths and drawbacks, whether they will become effective and suc-
cessful will depend on the process by which they are transplanted. Before transplant, policymakers should
identify what they seek to achieve through law reform. They should not just transplant laws for the sake of
transplantation, or even harmonization. Instead, they should evaluate local conditions and select a model
that would best fit these conditions. They should further explore whether adaptations are needed to make
the transplanted law effective. Finally, after the law's adoption, they should determine if further adjustments
are needed at the implementation stage to assimilate the law to local conditions. After all, "like the transplant
of plants or human organs, the process requires a careful process of evaluation, selection, adaptation, and
assimilation."
Yu, Canadian UGC Exception, supra note 3, at 182; see also supra note 213 (collecting articles that discuss the
benefits of customizing legal transplants).
224. See Kahn-Freund, supra note 3, at 24 (noting that the potential for transplanted laws to "upset
longstanding traditions in the recipient countries"); Yu, Digital Copyright Reform, supra note 3, at 770 (noting
that hastily adopted legal transplants "may be both ineffective and insensitive to local conditions" and "may. . .
stifle local development while upsetting the existing local tradition").
225. See Yu, Quest for User-Friendly Copyright, supra note 74, at 338-41 (discussing the criticism that fair
use transplants contradict the local legal tradition while creating unintended consequences).
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Moreover, some jurisdictions have been cautious in transplanting the fair
use model.226 While legal transplants can help align transplanting jurisdictions
with donor jurisdictions, thereby preempting potential challenges by the latter,227
the donor jurisdiction in this area-the United States-has actively discouraged
the adoption of fair use in international instruments or through domestic legisla-
tion. A case in point concerns the negotiations on the Marrakesh Treaty to Facil-
itate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired,
or Otherwise Print Disabled.2 28 During those negotiations, the U.S. State Depart-
ment was caught issuing an embarrassing secret demarche to encourage the re-
moval of references to fair use in the draft text of the treaty.229
C. Legislative Process
Interest group politics provides an ideal starting point for analyzing the leg-
islative process. As we have learned from the literature on public choice theory,
the legislative process-whether in the United States, Europe, or Asia--can be
easily captured by special interests. Indeed, the copyright industries are notorious
for their ability to capture the legislative process.2 30 The lobbying by these in-
dustries was so intense that William Patry used the word "lobbynomics" to de-
scribe "the continual use of exaggerated (and often false) claims and crises as an
excuse to pass laws that are unnecessary and many times harmful."2 3 1
226. See id. at 286-300 (discussing the Hong Kong government's cautious approach to introducing fair use
and other copyright reforms).
227. As I noted in an earlier chapter:
[Liegal transplants may help provide pre-emptive defences to countries that face repeated or intense pres-
sure from their more powerful trading partners, not to mention the strong likelihood that the laws in these
powerful countries will eventually become international standards by virtue of the source countries' sheer
economic and political might. It is no coincidence that many developing countries have adopted US stand-
ards in part to avoid the continuous pressure from US intellectual property industries and their supportive
governments. Even if external pressure does not come from the United States-for example, when it comes
from the European Union instead-having US standards in place could help deflate the pressure by trans-
forming a one-sided battle into a more even-handed global dispute.
Yu, Transplant and Transformation, supra note 3, at 33-34 (footnote omitted); see also Yu, Digital Copyright
Reform, supra note 3, at 755 ("Transplants may ... help provide preemptory defenses to countries that face
repeated and intense pressure from their more powerful trading partners, not to mention the strong likelihood that
the laws in these powerful countries will eventually become international standards by virtue of the source coun-
tries' sheer economic and political might.").
228. Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Im-
paired or Otherwise Print Disabled, June 27, 2013, 52 I.L.M. 1312. This treaty provides individuals with print
disabilities with easy or ready access to copyright publications.
229. See James Love, US Department of State Demarche Against Fair Use in WIPO Treaty for Blind,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (June 23,2013), https://keionline.org/22253 (discussing the demarche).
230. See generally MONICA HORTEN, A COPYRIGHT MASQUERADE: How CORPORATE LOBBYING
THREATENS ONLINE FREEDOMS (2013) (discussing how legislative capture by the copyright industries has un-
dermined online freedom); BRINK LINDSEY & STEVEN TELES, THE CAPTURED ECONOMY: How THE POWERFUL
ENRICH THEMSELVES, SLOW DOWN GROWTH, AND INCREASE INEQUALITY 64-89 (2017) (discussing capture in
the intellectual property area).
231. WILLIAM F. PATRY, How TO Fix COPYRIGHT 6 (2011).
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In her pioneering work, Jessica Litman discussed in detail how the copy-
right lawmaking process has been set up in a way that would represent the mul-
tiple interests at the negotiation table.23 2 As she explained:
The legislative materials disclose a process of continuing negotiations
among various industry representatives, designed and supervised by Con-
gress and the Copyright Office and aimed at forging a modem copyright
statute from a negotiated consensus. During more than twenty years of ne-
gotiations, the substantive content of the statute emerged as a series of in-
terrelated and dependent compromises among industries with differing in-
terests in copyright. The record demonstrates that members of Congress
chose to enact compromises whose wisdom they doubted because of their
belief that, in this area of law, the solution of compromise was the best
solution.233
A case in point is the codification of the fair use doctrine in Section 107 of
the U.S. Copyright Act, one of the statute's few limitations and exceptions on
the general scope of copyright.234 As Professor Litman observed:
Representatives of copyright owners . .. preferred that the fair use doctrine
represent the only flexibility principle in the statute's complex scheme of
232. See generally LITMAN, supra note 2 (discussing the copyright lawmaking process).
233. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, supra note 2, at 862. Later in her book, Professor Litman wrote:
What we have [in the DMCA] is what a variety of different private parties were able to extract from each
other in the course of an incredibly complicated four-year multiparty negotiation. Unsurprisingly, they paid
for that with a lot of rent-seeking at the expense of new upstart industries and the public at large.
LrrMAN, supra note 2, at 145; see also Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 29, 53 (1994) ("The only way that copyright laws get passed in [the United States] is for all the lawyers who
represent he current stakeholders to get together .... This process has produced laws that are unworkable from
the vantage point of people who were not among the negotiating parties." (footnote omitted)).
Professor Litman's observation was supported by the remarks made by former U.S. Register of Copy-
rights Abraham Kaminstein in his 1965 testimony to the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trade-
marks:
In the hearings on this bill held before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Judiciary Committee earlier this
year a question was raised as to why, in view of the fast-evolving communications technology, there have
not been more frequent revisions of the copyright law. If there is a single answer to this question, I believe
it is that there are so many interrelated creator-user interests in the copyright field, and they present such
sharp conflicts on individual issues, that the consensus necessary for any general revision is extremely dif-
ficult to achieve. Examples ofthis difficulty are found throughout he concentrated efforts to revise the 1909
act which went on continuously between 1924 and 1940 and which all ended in failure and futility. Realizing
fully what copyright law revision is up against, Arthur Fisher, my predecessor as Register of Copyrights,
planned a program that would be based on a thorough knowledge of all the issues and a painstaking effort
to resolve as many disputes as possible before a bill reached the stage of congressional hearings. It took us
10 years, but the program he planned has been carried out to the best of our ability.
Litman, Copyright, Compromise, supra note 2, at 872-73.
234. As Professor Litman observed:
In the midst of these expansively defined rights and rigid exemptions, the fair use doctrine became the
statute's central source of flexibility. In the earliest versions of the bill, the beleaguered fair use provision
offered the sole means of tempering the expansive scope of the copyright owner's exclusive rights. Fair use
was also the sole safe harbor for interests that lacked the bargaining power to negotiate a specific exemption.
In 1969, the Senate Subcommittee added a second provision limiting the general scope of copyright. This
second limitation was the distinction between idea and expression, a fundamental principle of traditional
copyright law codified in section 102(b) "in response to the great debate over computers. [The provision
was] intended to disclaim any intention to protect a programmer's algorithms under the bill." These two
provisions remained the only general limiting principles in the statute as enacted in 1976.
Litman, Copyright, Compromise, supra note 2, at 886 (footnotes omitted).
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
expansive rights and rigid exceptions. Educational organizations went
along only on the condition that the statutory definition of fair use restrict
the doctrine's unpredictability-the very feature that authors and publish-
ers found attractive. Copyright owners had long claimed that much of what
educational users were doing and wanted to continue doing, including most
educational photocopying, was not within the fair use exception. Educa-
tional organizations were unwilling to accept a definition of fair use unless
it were stretched to include educational photocopying and other common
educational uses. The parties agreed to insert words here and there, in both
the statutory provision and the House Committee Report, that appeared to
stretch the fair use privilege enough to offer educators some minimal cer-
tainty. The language on which they compromised, however, was ambigu-
ous, and intentionally so, because copyright owners and educational organ-
izations never fully resolved their disputes. Both interests envisioned
flexible application of the fair use doctrine, but they failed to reach a con-
sensus as to the doctrine's scope.235
While the interest group politics generated by the entrenched copyright in-
dustries explain why policy-makers and legislators in support of these industries
would work hard to frustrate efforts to introduce legislation based on the fair use
model, it does not explain why many jurisdictions ended up adopting a hybrid
model. Indeed, given the continuous strength of the copyright lobby in these ju-
risdictions,2 36 one would expect the fair use model to be rejected, as opposed to
emerging in a hybrid form. Given that the model prevailed to a large extent, in-
terest group politics must have gone in the opposite direction.
Clearly, some policy-makers and legislators were eager to introduce legis-
lative changes based on the fair use model to respond to economic, social, cul-
tural, and technological change.2 3 7 That is indeed why these policy-makers and
legislators called for a paradigm shift. The transformative changes posed by the
Internet and other new technologies speak for themselves. It is also understand-
able why many policy-makers and legislators, after undertaking an independent
assessment, appreciated the need for new legislation that strikes a more appro-
priate balance between access and proprietary control in the copyright system.2 38
235. Id. at 887-88 (footnotes omitted).
236. See Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1376 (2010) (noting the success in
pushing for graduated response system in France); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the
Nonmultilateral Era, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1045, 1058 (2012) (noting that "Chile, France, South Korea, and Taiwan
have adopted this system").
237. See ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 95 ("A technology-neutral open standard such as fair use
has the dynamism or agility to respond to 'future technologies, economies and circumstances-that don't yet
exist, or haven't yet been foreseen'.").
238. The economic picture about the incentives provided by the existing copyright system has been mixed.
For economic literature relating to intellectual property, see generally ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (2005); THOMAS F.
CoTrER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2013); CHRISTINE
GREENHALGH & MARK ROGERS, INNOVATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND EcoNOMIC GROWTH (2010);
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH (Carsten Fink &
Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, GROWTH AND TRADE (Keith E. Maskus ed., 2008);
wILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
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In addition, the popularization of the Internet and social media and the con-
tinued arrival of new technologies have brought to the legislative process new
and increasingly powerful interests, which seek to capture the legislative process
from the opposite direction.239 Thus far, commentators and pundits have widely
criticized companies such as Google for pushing for positions that undermine the
strong protection and enforcement standards in the copyright system.240 Limita-
tions and exceptions that have raised questions in this direction include the cop-
yright exception for noncommercial user-generated content under Section 29.21
of the Canadian Copyright Modernization Act24 1 and the proposed exception for
innovation under Section 106E of the Irish Copyright and Related Rights Act.242
To appreciate the changing politics, one could also recall the time when
Congress considered the SOPA/PIPA legislation.2 43 On January 18, 2002, Wik-
ipedia, Reddit, WordPress, and other Internet companies flexed their muscles by
launching an Internet blackout, causing congressional representatives to quickly
withdraw their support for the controversial bills.244 This blackout caused ordi-
nary citizens to bombard their legislators with requests to reject the proposed
legislation.24 5 As Senator Ron Wyden (D-Or.) rightly observed in a Senate Fi-
nance Committee hearing shortly after the blackout, "The norm changed on Jan.
(2003); KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000); KEITH E.
MASKUS, PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC PROBLEMS: THE GLOBAL ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE 21ST CENTURY (2012); SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2004); WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER
RESEARCH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND COUNTRIES WITH ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION (2009).
239. See generally EDWARD LEE, THE FIGHT FOR THE FUTURE: How PEOPLE DEFEATED HOLLYWOOD AND
SAVED THE INTERNET-FOR Now (2013) (discussing the grassroots movements involving the protests against
the U.S. SOPA/PIPA legislation and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement).
240. See Annemarie Bridy & Aaron Perzanowski, Has Google Paid Offan Army ofAcademic Research-
ers?, L.A. TIMES (July 21, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.comlopinion/op-ed/la-oe-bridy-perzanowski-
google-tp-20170721-story.html (criticizing the flawed study conducted by the Campaign for Accountability on
the funding Google has provided to academic research projects relating to antitrust, intellectual property, and
other legal policy issues); Daniel Sanchez, Is Google Behind the Recent Firing at the U.S. Copyrights Office?,
DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.digitalmusionews.com/2016/10/24/pallante-dismissed-cop-
yrights-office-google (noting questions regarding Google's role in the departure of the U.S. Register of Copy-
rights). Google seems to be the easy target in part because of the changes it has posed to the existing copyright
system and in part to the raw power it has slowly acquired. See generally JOHNS, supra note 54, at 510-14
(discussing the challenge Google and its Library project has posed to the strong proprietary model underlying
the copyright system).
241. Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20, § 29.21 (Can.).
242. CRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 73.
243. Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Preventing Real Online Threats to
Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011 (PIPA), S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011). For
criticisms of SOPA and PIPA, see generally Peter K. Yu, The Alphabet Soup of Transborder Intellectual Property
Enforcement, DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE, June 2012, at 16, https://lawreviewdrake.files.wordpress.com/
2015/01/yu-9-3.pdf [hereinafter Yu, Alphabet Soup].
244. See Jonathan Weisman, In Fight over Piracy Bills, New Economy Rises Against Old, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 18, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/technology/web-protests-piracy-bill-and-2-key-senators-
change-course.html (reporting the blackout).
245. See Yu, Alphabet Soup, supra note 243, at 32-33. See generally LEE, supra note 239, at 55-78 (dis-
cussing the blackout and its aftermath).
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18, 2012, when millions and millions of Americans said we will not accept being
locked out of debates about Internet freedom."246
Thus, the adoption of hybrid models in many jurisdictions seeking to intro-
duce fair use, to a large extent, has reflected the ongoing battle between the dif-
ferent interest groups that are to be impacted by copyright law reform. In the
United States, a good analogy can be found in the battle between the different
industries in the early 1990s when they pushed Congress to adopt a compromise
bill known as the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992.247 That statute was largely
a legal settlement between the recording and home electronics industries (with a
carve-out for the computer hardware industry and the subsequent endorsement
of music publishers, songwriters, and performing rights organizations).24 8 As Da-
vid Nimmer recounted:
On July 28, 1989, in Athens, Greece, worldwide negotiations between rec-
ord companies and hardware manufacturers culminated in an accord be-
tween those two factions. Other factions of the music industry nonetheless
remained dissatisfied with that bilateral solution. Accordingly, further ne-
gotiations ensued among music publishers, songwriters, performing rights
societies, and the groups that had previously reached agreement.249
While interest group politics provide very useful insights into why jurisdic-
tions seeking to introduce fair use ended up adopting a hybrid model, this Section
argues that public choice theory does not provide a complete picture. In fact,
there are other explanations that help account for the legislatures' ultimate choice
in retaining a considerable part of the status quo.
To begin with, legislators, especially those trained in the law, have a strong
preference for maintaining the status quo.250 In common law jurisdictions, stare
decisis and the use of precedents form a key part of legal education. Lawyers in
both common law and civil law jurisdictions have also learned to take a con-
servative approach to the law, which Guido Calabresi referred to as "retentionist
246. Joseph J. Schatz, Technology Groups Worry About Trade Pact, CQ TODAY ONLINE NEWS (Mar. 13,
2012, 11:47 PM), http://public.cq.com/docs/news/news-000004045563.html?ref-corg.
247. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2018).
248. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8B.01[C] (Perm. ed. 2016)
(recounting the negotiations between record companies, hardware manufacturers, music publishers, songwriters,
and performing rights societies).
249. Id; see also Gary S. Lutzker, Dat's All Folks: Cahn v. Sony and the Audio Home Recording Act of
1991-Merrie Melodies or Looney Tunes?, 11 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 145, 164-74 (1992) (discussing the
dispute leading to the adoption of the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992).
250. As Judge Richard Posner declared:
Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most "past-dependent,"
of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient practices, ancient texts,
archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a method
of recovering history. It is suspicious of innovation, discontinuities, "paradigm shifts," and the energy and
brashness of youth.
Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique ofHistory in Adjudication and Legal Scholar-
ship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (2000); see also Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-in Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 813 (1998) (discussing the lock-in effects in law); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, I10 HARV.
L. REV. 991, 1001 (1997) ("It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down
in the time of Henry IV.").
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bias."2 5' Moreover, many legislatures have specific procedures supporting the
retention of the status quo.252 If the fair use model is to be introduced to replace
the existing system of copyright limitations and exceptions, the legislation sup-
porting this new model has to be able to earn the support of different constituen-
cies.
When these preferences and infrastructures are combined together, they re-
flect what commentators have r ferred to as "legislative inertia."253 As then-Dean
Calabresi explained in the U.S. context, there are many obstacles militating
against the adoption of a new law, such as "bicameral legislatures, federalism,
executive authority, and . .. legislative committees. "254 In The Ages ofAmerican
Law, Grant Gilmore also observed, "[o]ne of the facts of legislative life, at least
in this country in [the twentieth] century, is that getting a statute enacted in the
first place is much easier than getting the statute revised so that it will make sense
in the light of changed conditions."255
Moreover, in his examination of the gap between rhetoric and reality in
copyright law, Stewart Sterk suggested that " he nation's elite, including its law-
makers, has a stake in believing and acting on copyright rhetoric. [Their] invest-
ment in the status quo reinforces the power of the interest groups who have fueled
copyright expansion."256 Citing the work of Friedrich Hayek,257 he observed:
One explanation for the general failure to question copyright rhetoric is that
participants in the lawmaking process-not only legislators and judges, but
also lawyers, opinionmakers, and persons with wealth and political influ-
ence-have a self-interest in widespread acceptance of the proposition that
authors deserve to benefit from their work. Rejecting the argument that au-
thors deserve returns from their labors also would undermine the claim that
prosperous members of society deserve their prosperity.258
If what Professor Sterk suggested indeed explains the behavior of some legisla-
tors, it is understandable why they were eager to push for a hybrid model that
helped retain a considerable part of the existing copyright system.
Regardless of the reasons behind these legislative choices, the paradigm
evolution that has taken place in the copyright area reflects what commentators
251. GuIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 60 (1982).
252. As Judge Posner observed:
By creating an essentially tricameral legislature (the Senate, the House, and the President with his veto
power), the Constitution makes it difficult to enact statutory law; but once enacted, it is, by the same token,
difficult to change, because the legislative procedures for amending an existing statute are the same as those
for promulgating a brand new statute.
Posner, supra note 250, at 585.
253. CALABRESI, supra note 251, at 11; see also Posner, supra note 250, at 585 ("Legislators are not con-
strained by precedent, but their ability to innovate is limited by the inertia built into the legislative process, espe-
cially at the federal level in the United States.").
254. CALABRESI, supra note 251, at 4.
255. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 86 (2d ed. 1977).
256. Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1197, 1198 (1996).
257. See 2 F.A. HAYEK, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 73-74 (1976) (discussing the belief in the justice of
rewards).
258. Sterk, supra note 256, at 1247.
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have referred to as path dependence.25 9 Without the influence of the old fair deal-
ing paradigm set by the U.K. Copyright Act 1911, and without the adoption of a
fair dealing regime in the first place, many jurisdictions seeking to introduce fair
use today would probably have a much easier time introducing that new model.
Indeed, during the copyright reform process, it is not uncommon for the copy-
right industries to criticize fair use for its limited adoption throughout he
world.26 0 What these industries have conveniently ignored, however, is the path
dependence generated by colonial history.261 It is no coincidence that those ju-
risdictions that have now adopted or proposed to adopt fair use, such as Australia,
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Sri Lanka, are all former British colo-
nies.262
At the global level, path dependence takes on a different level of signifi-
cance. Because intellectual property norms do not reflect universal values, those
countries that were the creators or early adopters of these norms tend to possess
the ability to set future norms.263 The norms they set as a group will then be
259. As Oona Hathaway explained:
In broad terms, "path dependence" means that an outcome or decision is shaped in specific and systematic
ways by the historical path leading to it. It entails, in other words, a causal relationship between stages in a
temporal sequence, with each stage strongly influencing the direction of the following stage. At the most
basic level, therefore, path dependence implies that "what happened at an earlier point in time will affect
the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time."
Hathaway, supra note 43, at 603-04 (footnote omitted). The use of QWERTY keyboard provides a classic ex-
ample of path dependence. As John Bell observed:
The classic example is the QWERTY keyboard, which made sense when metal keys were used on typewrit-
ers because it avoided keys jamming, and it was the approach to typing that provided training for typists at
the key moment in the late nineteenth century in which several arrangements of typewriter keyboard were
available. But that arrangement of a keyboard makes little sense on the computer or the Blackberry, where
there are no keys to clash against each other. Yet it continues to be used because those who type on the
computer or use a Blackberry are used to that arrangement of keys.
John Bell, Path Dependence and Legal Development, 87 TUL. L. REv. 787, 794 (2013) (footnote omitted); see
also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819-20 (1st Cit. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring) ("Better
typewriter keyboard layouts may exist, but the familiar QWERTY keyboard dominates the market because that
is what everyone has learned to use.").
260. See Yu, Quest for User-Friendly Copyright, supra note 74, at 340-41 (discussing this line of criticism).
261. See id. at 340 ("[T]he reason why the fair dealing model still remains dominant in the world is not
necessarily due to its popularity or proven superiority. Instead, its dominance is a historical legacy. Many coun-
tries are former colonies of European powers."); see also SARA BANNERMAN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE 2 (2015) (noting that "[t]he international copyright system in its current form... is a
set of principles that arose out of chance and path dependency").
262. As I noted in an earlier article:
[T]he reason why the fair dealing model still remains dominant in the world is not necessarily due to its
popularity or proven superiority. Instead, its dominance is a historical legacy. Many countries are former
colonies of European powers. They had no choice but to transplant from their mother countries a closed-
ended regime of limitations and exceptions (such as the fair dealing model). The textbook colonial examples
are former British colonies such as Australia, Canada, and Singapore-countries whose copyright laws the
Hong Kong government actively considered in the three public consultations.
Yu, Quest for User-Friendly Copyright, supra note 74, at 340-41 (footnote omitted).
263. See ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP,
APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 247 (1998) ("The range of Western beliefs that define intellectual and cultural
property laws ... are not universal values that express the full range of human possibility, but particular, inter-
ested fictions emergent from a history of colonialism that has disempowered many of the world's peoples.");
Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First Century,
50 Am. U. L. REv. 131, 235 (2000) ("[T]he Western intellectual property regime becomes universal because it is
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multilateralized through international treaties to a growing number of new mem-
bers, such as those joining the TRIPS Agreement or the WIPO Internet Trea-
264ties.
Even though the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty2 65 and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works2 66 were created by mostly European powers in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries,267 the norms set in these two conventions have now been
incorporated by reference into the TRIPS Agreement.2 68 At the time of writing,
the WTO has 164 members, all of which abide by TRIPS standards.2 69 Should
the fair use language be included in the TRIPS Agreement in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, it would have been transplanted to other jurisdictions via the WTO.
Sadly, as noted in the previous Section, the United States, a major demandeur
country during the TRIPS negotiations, has steadfastly refused to transplant fair
use abroad despite being the leader in this area.270
D. Summary
There are many different contributing factors, which range from economic
to social and from legal to technological. The scope and length of this Article do
not allow for an in-depth discussion of the myriad factors outside the legal sys-
tem. Nevertheless, this Part covers three different areas of the law: intellectual
property law, international and comparative law, and the legislative process. It
shows that, even when we focus on causes within the legal system, contributing
factors can come from many directions. The analysis in this Part is important
because the continued expansion of the intellectual property system will likely
cause the system to implicate many new areas of the law.
backed by great economic and military might, rather than because of its 'appeal to common sense or .. . innate
conceptual force."' (quoting William P. Alford, How Theory Does--and Does Not-Matter: American Ap-
proaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 17 (1994))).
264. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5; WCT, supra note 145; WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, at 18 (1997).
265. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828
U.N.T.S. 305 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967).
266. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221
(revised at Paris July 24, 1971).
267. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, upra note 7, at 330-54 (discussing the origins of the Paris and
Berne Conventions); see also Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations ofIntellectual Property: Narratives
ofDeveloping Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
315, 325-34 (2003) (discussing how the former colonies conducted their international intellectual property rela-
tions following their declarations of independence).
268. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2.1 ("In respect of Parts II, m and IV of this Agreement,
Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention (1967)."); id. art. 9.1
("Members shall comply with Articles I through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto.").
269. Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatise/
tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
270. See supra text accompanying notes 228-29; see also Justin Hughes, Fair Use and Its Politics-at
Home and Abroad, in AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS, supra note 106, at 234, 263-72 (explaining the
complexities involved in this refusal).
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Part III showed how the paradigm in international copyright norms has
evolved in light of the conscious choices made by those jurisdictions seeking to
introduce the fair use model. Part IV then offered explanations concerning why
these jurisdictions made those specific choices. This Part now turns to how the
paradigmatic insights we have gained from the previous two Parts can be used to
formulate recommendations concerning future efforts to broaden copyright lim-
itations and exceptions in the United States and across the world.
Section A outlines six courses of action that seek to improve these reform
efforts. Section B identifies three modalities that can help tailor the transplanted
fair use paradigm to local needs, interests, conditions, and priorities. Because the
analysis in this Part focuses on ways to combine rules, standards, and institutions,
it will be relevant to not only copyright reform, but also legal reform in other
areas of the law.
A. Courses ofAction
As far as the effort to reform copyright limitations and exceptions is con-
cerned, there are six specific courses of action that can be immediately taken to
ensure the development of a paradigm that better responds to economic, social,
cultural, and technological changes. First, policy-makers, legislators, and com-
mentators should no longer have the debate fixated on labels-in particular,
whether the proposed legislation is fair dealing or fair use. While fair dealing has
been identified by many as a rule and fair use a standard, the continued evolution
of fair dealing and the ubiquitous inclusion of multifactor balancing have made
this distinction increasingly untenable.271 Given the inherent difficulties in dis-
tinguishing between the two different regimes, the semantic debate on whether a
jurisdiction has fair dealing or fair use is simply unhelpful. Instead, a better ap-
proach is to focus on whether the list of copyright limitations and exceptions is
open or closed.272 Such an approach will not only allow us to achieve the law
and policy debate we want, but it will also enable us to find ways to expand the
scope of copyright limitations and exceptions. For instance, a jurisdiction that
seeks to have a broad fair dealing exception for quotation could easily achieve
many important benefits provided by the fair use exception, especially when
judges are willing to construe the exception liberally. Lamenting that this quota-
tion exception is still fair dealing but not fair use is likely to take away a valuable
opportunity to expand copyright limitations and exceptions.
Second, policy-makers, legislators, and commentators should stay away
from any discussion of the paradigm shift from fair dealing to fair use unless
there is a wholesale transplant of the fair use model-the new paradigm for the
271. See infra text accompanying notes 293-98.
272. Cf Yu, Quest for User-Friendly Copyright, supra note 74, at 327 ("[A] better way to distinguish be-
tween fair dealing and fair use is to describe the former as a closed-ended, purpose-based regime and the latter
as an open-ended, flexible regime.").
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purposes of this Article. As I have shown in an earlier article, except for Liberia,
Malaysia, and the Philippines-and, to a lesser extent, Israel-countries have
declined to transplant the fair use model verbatim or substantially verbatim.27 3
Oftentimes, the jurisdictions seeking to introduce the fair use model retain a con-
siderable part of their status quo, including preexisting fair dealing arrangements.
As a result, any analysis-legal, empirical, or otherwise-of the paradigm shift
from the status quo to the fair use model is mostly academic.274 Such shift-related
analyses should be discouraged, as it will make it difficult for reformers to high-
light the specific strengths of the proposed hybrid model while causing them to
be blindsided by the potential weaknesses of the fair use model. That type of
analysis will also harm the proposal by giving its opponents criticisms-or, more
precisely, red herrings2 7-that are not directly tied to the strengths and benefits
of the proposed hybrid model.
Third, policy-makers, legislators, and commentators should take great care
to ensure that the analysis they undertake is actually tailored to the copyright
limitations and exceptions involved. Otherwise, they will end up in a so-called
"garbage in, garbage out" situation, in which incorrect input ends up producing
faulty output. In the area involving new technology, when laws are often hastily
introduced without convincing empirical evidence, solid empirical analysis is
particularly important.276 Sadly, many of the existing studies on fair use pro-
posals have focused on an arguably fictitious paradigm shift from fair dealing to
fair use.277 While an actual shift would certainly have considerable ramifications
for business, technology, and society, that shift is of limited relevance to the hy-
brid model that many jurisdictions have chosen or proposed to adopt. As a result,
the existing studies about the potential costs or benefits of a paradigm shift from
fair dealing to fair use may need to be read and used with great care.278 How
273. See Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants, supra note 17, at 3-10 (discussing the efforts to transplant
fair use across the world and the eight different modalities of transplantation that the transplanting jurisdictions
have employed).
274. As I noted in an earlier article:
The hybrid model advanced by the open-ended, catch-all fair use proposal ... calls into question the rele-
vance and usefulness of the existing comparative studies on the distinctions between fair dealing and fair
use. ... I.f these comparative studies are to guide legislative reforms, adjustment will be needed considering
that these studies were not designed to explore the distinction between the fair dealing model and a hybrid
fair dealing/fair use model.
Yu, Quest for User-Friendly Copyright, supra note 74, at 330.
275. See Peter K. Yu, Friends ofOpposition to Copyright BillAmendments, Netizens Are Not Talking About
This, H.K. IN-MEDIA (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.inmediahk.net/node/1040375 (in Chinese) (discussing the straw
man and red herring arguments that the opponents of the fair use proposal have advanced in Hong Kong).
276. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, How To FIX COPYRIGHT 49-74 (2011) (noting the need to "replace a faith-
based approach to copyright with an evidence-based approach" (capitalization omitted)); Yu, Digital Copyright
and Confuzzling Rhetoric, supra note 58, at 918-23 (noting the need for credible empirical evidence).
277. See supra Section II.B (showing the lack of a paradigm shift in jurisdictions that ended up adopting a
hybrid model despite introducing or considering fair use proposals).
278. See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, UNDERSTANDING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF INTRODUCING
A "FAIR USE" EXCEPTION 14-15 (2016) (identifying "key potential cost and benefit categories associated with a
shift from fair dealing to fair use" (emphasis added)).
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useful these studies will be will largely depend on the exact structure of the pro-
posed hybrid model. The further away that model is from the fair use model, the
less relevant and instructive is the research about a potential paradigm shift.
Fourth, instead of transplanting fair use, we should focus more on designing
or customizing fair use. It is important to devote greater time, effort, and energy
to researching which model will Work best under specific local conditions. Even
if a hybrid model is to be introduced, that model will still require us to determine
the ideal mix of fair dealing and fair use provisions. To complicate matters fur-
ther, that model can include other provisions outside either the fair use or fair
dealing model,2 7 9 such as best practices relating to fair use.2 80 That model can
also include institutional complements, which will be discussed further in Sub-
section V.B.3. 2 8 1 The important takeaway from the wide adoption of hybrid mod-
els is the need to reject a simple, and often false, binary choice between fair deal-
ing and fair use. As Niva Elkin-Koren and Orit Fischman-Afori pointed out, the
two choices are better seen as part of a continuum.2 82 After all, both the fair deal-
ing and fair use regimes require the case-by-case balancing of multiple fairness
279. See, e.g., Amira Dotan et al., Fair Use Best Practices for Higher Education Institutions: The Israeli
Experience, 57 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 447 (2010) (discussing the process of drafting the Code of Fair Use
Best Practices in Israel); see also Niva Elkin-Koren & Orit Fischman-Afori, Taking Users'Rights to the Next
Level: A Pragmatist Approach to Fair Use, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 6 (2015) [hereinafter Elkin-Koren
& Fischman-Afori, Taking Users'Rights] ("[B]ottom-up norms should play an important role in formulating fair
use standards. Crafting rules by bottom-up norms may facilitate ongoing participation in lawmaking by relevant
communities of users and authors, thus enhancing the efficacy of copyright and strengthening its legitimacy.").
280. The most notable example in this area is the best practices in fair use for documentary filmmakers,
whose development was spearheaded by Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi. ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT
VIDEO AND FILMMAKERS ET AL., DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS' STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE
(2005), http://archive.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/fair use final.pdf; see also PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE &
PETER JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR
DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS (2004), http://archive.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/UNTOLDSTORIES
Report.pdf (exploring the implications of the rights clearance process on documentary filmmaking). A less suc-
cessful effort is the development of the fair use guidelines for educators. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Educational Fair
Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right to Photocopy Freely, 60 U. PIrr. L. REV. 149, 160 (1998) ("[Tjhough
Congress specifically declined to incorporate these Guidelines into the Copyright statute, courts have generally
held (and publishers have gleefully conceded) that educational photocopying that meets the Guidelines consti-
tutes fair use of copyrighted works."); Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion ofFair-Use
Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 701 (2001) ("One can only find failure in guidelines that have missed their
constructive goals and served destructive ends. The vast range of parties with an interest in proper application of
fair use have been poorly served by existing guidelines, and they would be better served had the guidelines never
existed.").
281. See discussion infra Subsection V.B.3 (discussing the institutionalization of hybrid models).
282. As they declared:
[Alt the theoretical level, we reject the binary choice between bright-line rules and vague standards, and
suggest that courts adapt a continuum-based approach to fair use. In particular, we argue that in order to
achieve the goals of fair use, courts should encourage the implementation f concrete rules within the open-
ended fair use standard. Only such an approach, we argue, could promote a reasoned implementation of fair
use and serve both the purpose of copyright law and the rule of law.
Elkin-Koren & Fischman-Afori, Taking Users 'Rights, supra note 279, at 5--6; see also Niva Elkin-Koren & Orit
Fischman-Afori, Rulifying Fair Use, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 163 (2017) [hereinafter Elkin-Koren & Fischman-
Afori, Rulhfying Fair Use] ("[T]he rule/standard distinction reflects a continuum, rather than a sharp binary divi-
sion. Judges soften rules through interpretation and, in a similar fashion, rulify standards by elaborating discrete
categories and developing contextual guidelines." (footnote omitted)).
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factors.2 83 Because a hybrid model is not as structurally distinctive as either fair
dealing or fair use, greater effort will also be needed in the design process to
customize fair use based on existing local conditions.
Fifth, as eager as we are to export fair use to other countries, we should
remember that legal transplant is a two-way street. As Alan Watson observed,
"the time of reception is often a time when the provision is looked at closely,
hence a time when law can be reformed or made more sophisticated. It thus gives
the recipient society a fine opportunity to become a donor in its turn." 28 4 More
than a century ago, Jeremy Bentham also wrote, "[t]hat a system might be de-
vised, which, while it would be better for Bengal, would also be better even for
England."285 Section IV.A has identified the weaknesses of the fair use model.
To respond to these weaknesses, those jurisdictions seeking to introduce fair use
may therefore want to explore proposals that take advantage of the attractive fea-
tures of preexisting fair dealing arrangements. Consider the United States for
example. Although the country already has many limitations and exceptions in
the Copyright Act besides the fair use provision,286 it does not have any other
limitation or exception that requires the type of multifactor balancing found in a
traditional fair use analysis. In addition, policy-makers and commentators tend
to assume that having a standalone fair use provision is better than having mul-
tiple fair use provisions.287 Yet we have not spent much time and effort exploring
both legally and empirically the validity of these assumptions. Indeed, the ongo-
ing developments in other jurisdictions have given us a valuable opportunity to
evaluate and reexamine our system of copyright limitations and exceptions at
home.
Finally, the continued disagreement over the benefits provided by fair deal-
ing and fair use underscores the need for caution in making recommendations
that are to be implemented at the global level. The Max Planck Declaration on a
Balanced Interpretation of the "Three-Step Test" in Copyright Law seems to
have struck the right balance by focusing on "open ended limitations and excep-
tions, so long as the scope of such limitations and exceptions is reasonably fore-
seeable."288 Such an approach qualifies open-endedness with the concept of rea-
sonable foreseeability. While this declaration aimed to convince policy-makers
and commentators in continental Europe of the possibility of adopting an open
list of limitations and exceptions in civil law jurisdictions, this approach will give
283. See Geist, supra note 19, 158 ("[Like fair use, flair dealing .. . incorporates fairness criteria to assure
reasonable use of works, yet the key difference between fair use and fair dealing lies in the circumscribed pur-
poses found under fair dealing."); Yu, Quest for User-Friendly Copyright, supra note 74, at 332 (noting that the
fair dealing provisions in Hong Kong "require[] the balancing of fairness factors," similarly to what U.S. fair use
analysis requires).
284. WATSON, supra note 3, at 99.
285. JEREMY BENTHAM, Of the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation, in THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 171, 185 (2005) (1843).
286. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122 (2018) (providing various limitations and exceptions in the U.S. copyright
regime).
287. See Yu, Quest for User-Friendly Copyright, supra note 74, at 327-30 (discussing the difference be-
tween a standalone fair use provision and a supplemental catch-all fair use provision).
288. MAX PLANCK DECLARATION, supra note 148, [ 3(a).
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policy-makers and legislators the flexibility needed to determine which limita-
tions and exceptions should be included in an open list. After all, as much as
policy-makers, legislators, and commentators have been worrying about the un-
customized transplant of TRIPS and TRIPS-plus standards, they have to be
equally concerned about the potential drawbacks and risks of the uncustomized
transplant of the fair use model, even when that model is known to have provided
many important benefits.
B. Modalities
The previous Section has outlined the different courses of action that can
improve the effort to reform copyright limitations and exceptions. This Section
turns to three modalities that can better tailor the transplanted fair use paradigm
to local needs, interests, conditions, and priorities. Such tailoring will enlarge the
flexibilities available in the copyright system.2 89 It will also enable the system to
strike a more appropriate balance between access and proprietary control.
Subsections 1 and 2 illustrate how rules and standards can be combined to
create laws and policies that are suitable to specific local conditions. Subsection
3 then explores how institutions can be developed or brought in to further
strengthen this combination. Rather than perpetuating the age-old debate on the
superiority of rules or standards,29 0 this Section calls for a more constructive de-
bate on the different ways to combine rules, standards, and institutions. Such a
debate will help redirect our focus to designing or customizing fair use, as op-
posed to merely transplanting it.
289. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 23, at 869-70 (discussing the limitations,
flexibilities, and public interest safeguards in the TRIPS Agreement). For commentaries emphasizing the flexi-
bilities within the TRIPS Agreement, see generally CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2007); UNCTAD-ICTSD
PROJECT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS
AND DEVELOPMENT (2005).
290. For discussions of the distinction between rules and standards, see generally H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 124-35 (2d ed. 1994); John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory ofLegal Certainty,
27 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 47 (2002); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices ofRules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); Cass
R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953 (1995). For discussions in the intellectual property area,
see generally ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 98-100 (discussing rules and standards in the fair use
context); ChiangTun-Jen, The Rules and Standards ofPatentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1353 (2010)
(breaking Section 101 of the U.S. Patent Act down into rules and standards, and providing utilitarian justifications
for each type of subject-matter restriction covered by the provision); Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cy-
berspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275 (2002) (discussing rules and standards in the cyberlaw context); Thomas
B. Nachbar, Rules and Standards in Copyright, 52 Hous. L. REV. 583 (2014) (discussing the implications of
shifting copyright law in the direction of either rules or standards).
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1. Standardizing Rules
The first modality concerns efforts to turn rules into standards. Such efforts
are not that unusual, considering that policy-makers, legislators, and commenta-
tors have already questioned the distinction between rules and standards.291 With
respect to provisions that have been developed under the old fair dealing para-
digm, courts have increasingly treated them as standards or converted them as
such.292
Consider again Section 30(2) of the U.K. Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act 1988,293 the fair dealing exception for the purpose of reporting current events
discussed in Section II.C. This provision states explicitly that "[flair dealing with
a work (other than a photograph) for the purpose of reporting current events does
not infringe any copyright in the work provided that. . . it is accompanied by a
sufficient acknowledgement."294 Because this provision specifies the permissible
conduct and does not require any case-by-case balancing of the fairness factors,
it is best described as a rule, not a standard.
Nevertheless, in Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd., Lord Phillips inter-
preted the provision by introducing several fairness factors.2 95 As he observed,
quoting with approval the late Justice Hugh Laddie's noted treatise:
It is impossible to lay down any hard-and-fast definition of what is fair
dealing, for it is a matter of fact, degree and impression. However, by far
the most important factor is whether the alleged fair dealing is in fact com-
mercially competing with the proprietor's exploitation of the copyright
work, a substitute for the probable purchase of authorised copies, and the
like. If it is, the fair dealing defence will almost certainly fail. If it is not
and there is a moderate taking and there are no special adverse factors, the
291. See Yu, Quest for User-Friendly Copyright, supra note 74, at 322 ("While th[e] rule-standard distinc-
tion is easy for the public to comprehend and has been widely used by legal commentators, including those in
the intellectual property field, such a distinction does not work very well in regard to the fair dealing/fair use
debate." (footnotes omitted)).
292. As Lord Denning declared in the classic case of Hubbard v. Vosper:
It is impossible to define what is "fair dealing". It must be a question of degree. You must consider first the
number and extent of the quotations and extracts. Are they altogether too many and too long to be fair?
Then you must consider the use made of them. If they are used as a basis for comment, criticism or review,
that may be fair dealing. If they are used to convey the same information as the author, for a rival purpose,
that may be unfair. Next, you must consider the proportions. To take long extracts and attach short com-
ments may be unfair. But, short extracts and long comments may be fair. Other considerations may come
to mind also. But, after all is said and done, it must be a matter of impression. As with fair comment in the
law of libel, so with fair dealing in the law of copyright. The tribunal of fact must decide. In the present
case, there is material on which the tribunal of fact could find this to be fair dealing.
Hubbard v. Vosper, [1972] 2 Q.B. 84 (Eng.); see also D'Agostino, supra note 66, at 342-43 (extracting from
English copyright law the following fairness factors: nature of the work, how the work was obtained, amount
taken, uses made, commercial benefit, motives for the dealing, consequences of the dealing, and purpose achieved
by different means); Yu, Quest for User-Friendly Copyright, supra note 74, at 323 ("[B]ecause of the common
law tradition in those Commonwealth jurisdictions embracing the fair dealing model, the use of fairness factors
often emerge through case law even when those factors have not been written into the statutory provisions.").
293. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 30(2) (Eng.).
294. Id
295. Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1142 (Eng.).
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defence is likely to succeed, especially if the defendant's additional pur-
pose is to right a wrong, to ventilate an honest grievance, to engage in po-
litical controversy, and so on. The second most important factor is whether
the work has already been published or otherwise exposed to the public. If
it has not, and especially if the material has been obtained by a breach of
confidence or other mean or underhand dealing, the courts will be reluctant
to say this is fair. However this is by no means conclusive, for sometimes
it is necessary for the purposes of legitimate public controversy to make
use of "leaked" information. The third most important factor is the amount
and importance of the work that has been taken. For, although it is permis-
sible to take a substantial part of the work (if not, there could be no question
of infringement in the first place), in some circumstances the taking of an
excessive amount, or the taking of even a small amount if on a regular ba-
sis, would negative fair dealing.2 96
By introducing these factors, Lord Phillips successfully "standardized" the
rule in Section 30(2).297 With the consideration of the added factors, the only
difference between this now-standardized rule and a fair use provision is the re-
quirement that the conduct at issue fits the specified purpose. As Michael Geist
observed: "The [fair dealing] model creates a two-stage analysis: first, whether
the intended use qualifies for one of the permitted purposes, and second, whether
the use itself meets the fairness criteria. By contrast, fair use raises only the sec-
ond-stage analysis, since there are no statutory limitations on permitted pur-
poses."298
To be sure, a rule will provide more certainty to both copyright holders and
users. Standardizing the rule could therefore burden them by muddling an other-
wise clear rule. Nevertheless, in its comparison between fair dealing and fair use,
the ALRC reminded us of the need to distinguish between simple and complex
rules. As the Commission stated, "a clear principled standard is more certain than
an unclear complex rule."299 This statement built on John Braithwaite's work,
which has been elaborated as follows:
1. When the type of action to be regulated is simple, stable and does not
involve huge economic interests, rules tend to regulate with greater cer-
tainty than principles.
2. When the type of action to be regulated is complex, changing and in-
volves large economic interests:
(a) principles tend to regulate with greater certainty than rules;
(b) binding principles backing non-binding rules tend to regulate with
greater certainty than principles alone;
296. Id. 170.
297. See id.
298. Geist, supra note 19, at 158.
299. ALRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 112.
162 [Vol. 2019
(c) binding principles backing non-binding rules are more certain still if
they are embedded in institutions of regulatory conversation that foster
shared sensibilities.300
Indeed, there are many tactical benefits to standardizing rules. For instance,
"[f]aw that incorporates principles or standards [are] generally more flexible and
adaptive than prescriptive rules."30' As a result, standardized rules may allow
courts and law enforcement personnel to strike a better balance in the copyright
system than rules alone. In addition, greater standardization may allow otherwise
unacceptable rules to be more politically palatable. From a copyright user's
standpoint, obtaining a clear rule on limitation and exception is preferable to ob-
taining a standard that involves multifactor balancing. Nevertheless, when cop-
yright limitations and exceptions are being considered, rules can sometimes be
rejected because they are considered as either overinclusive or underinclusive.302
In that case, standardization can help make these rules more palatable to oppos-
ing policy-makers and legislators.
A case in point is a proposal modeling after Section 29.21 of the Canadian
Copyright Modernization Act.303 This attractive, yet controversial, provision cre-
ates an exception for the development and dissemination of noncommercial user-
generated content.3 04 Although the provision has earned the support of many,
myself included,305 policy-makers, commentators, and industry representatives
300. Braithwaite, supra note 290, at 75.
301. ALRC FtNAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 87.
302. See Elkin-Koren & Fischman-Afori, Rulifying Fair Use, supra note 282, at 195 ("[T]he over- or under-
inclusiveness of a rule generates decisions that are 'obtuse, unfair, or otherwise contrary to the "spirit" of the
doctrinal inquiry being conducted."').
303. Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2011, c. 22 (Can.). Section 29.21 provides:
(1) It is not an infringement of copyright for an individual to use an existing work or other subject-matter
or copy of one, which has been published or otherwise made available to the public, in the creation of a new
work or other subject-matter in which copyright subsists and for the individual-or, with the individual's
authorization, a member of their household-to use the new work or other subject-matter or to authorize an
intermediary to disseminate it, if
(a) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or other subject-matter is done solely
for non-commercial purposes;
(b) the source-and, if given in the source, the name of the author, performer, maker or broadcaster-
of the existing work or other subject-matter or copy of it are mentioned, if it is reasonable in the circum-
stances to do so;
(c) the individual had reasonable grounds to believe that the existing work or other subject-matter or
copy of it, as the case may be, was not infringing copyright; and
(d) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or other subject-matter does not have
a substantial adverse effect, financial or otherwise, on the exploitation or potential exploitation of the
existing work or other subject-matter--or copy of it-or on an existing or potential market for it, includ-
ing that the new work or other subject-matter is not a substitute for the existing one.
(2) The following definitions apply in subsection (1).
'intermediary' means a person or entity who regularly provides space or means for works or other sub-
ject-matter to be enjoyed by the public.
'use' means to do anything that by this Act the owner of the copyright has the sole right to do, other than
the right to authorize anything.
Id. § 29.21.
304. See id.
305. See Yu, Canadian UGC Exception, supra note 3 (exploring the feasibility of transplanting Section
29.21 of the Canadian Copyright Modernization Act abroad); Yu, Quest for User-Friendly Copyright, supra note
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continue to criticize it for failing to comply with international copyright stand-
ards,306 in particular the three-step test under the TRIPS Agreement and the
WIPO Copyright Treaty.307 For those jurisdictions that are eager to introduce a
similar exception but remain concerned about the provision's criticisms, stand-
ardizing this rule-based provision by adding multiple fairness factors could make
it more politically palatable. Such a compromise will also be more attractive than
succumbing to the opposition and abandoning the entire exception.
For broader copyright reform in the United States, it is also worth consid-
ering whether new limitations and exceptions can be developed by adding the
fair use factors found in Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act.3 08 Such addition
will make the newly created exceptions similar to those factor-intensive fair deal-
ing provisions that are now found in Israel, Liberia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and other jurisdictions.30 9 In the
current U.S. copyright statute, except for Section 107, no other provisions con-
dition the outcome on a case-by-case balancing of multiple fair use factors. One,
therefore, cannot help but wonder whether the introduction of fairness factors
could make some new limitations and exceptions possible, or at least more po-
litically palatable.
2. Rulifying Standards
The second modality pertains to efforts to turn standards into rules-or, in
the words of Niva Elkin-Koren and Orit Fischman-Afori, to "rulify" standards.31 0
As Professors Elkin-Koren and Fischman-Afori explained:
Copyright exceptions drafted as rules would ... offer more certainty; how-
ever, this certainty comes at the cost of rigidity that may fail to address the
needs of users in a dynamic environment.
For many years, these tradeoffs in copyright policy were presented as
a binary choice between rules and standards. The rule/standard distinction,
however, overlooks the dynamic nature of adjudication, which is shaping
the nature of legal norms. As recently recognized by legal theorists, the
rule/standard distinction reflects a continuum, rather than a sharp binary
division. Judges soften rules through interpretation and, in a similar fash-
ion, rulify standards by elaborating discrete categories and developing con-
textual guidelines. 311
To be sure, policy-makers and commentators may express skepticism of
this approach. Nevertheless, the approach may have already been put in practice,
74, at 327-30 (discussing the proposal to create a copyright exception for predominantly non-commercial user-
generated content).
306. See Yu, Canadian UGC Exception, supra note 3, at 190-96 (responding to these criticisms); Yu,
Confuzzling Rhetoric, supra note 122, at 287-95 (responding to these criticisms).
307. See sources cited supra notes 144-45.
308. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018) (providing the fairness factors).
309. See, e.g., Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 40(2) (Austl.); Copyright Act, (2006) Cap. 63, § 35(2) (Sing.).
310. Elkin-Koren & Fischman-Afori, Rulifying Fair Use, supra note 282.
311. Id. at 163.
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even though it is rarely discussed. As commentators have noted, soft rules exist
under the current fair use paradigm. Examples of these soft rules include rules
concerning whether the purpose of the use is commercial,312 whether the original
work is published,3 13 whether the use involves reverse engineering of software
through decompilation or disassembly of object code,314 whether "time shifting"
has taken place,315 and whether commercial piracy is involved.3 16
The consideration of efforts to rulify standards is particularly important
when we explore possibilities for future copyright reform.1 As much as we have
explored ways to transplant fair use to other jurisdictions, it is time we used the
transplant process to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of our existing fair
use model. It is also worth exploring whether there are benefits to cross-fertiliz-
ing fair use with fair dealing, such as those proposals adopted in Singapore and
Sri Lanka.318
While fair use has provided many important benefits, which support its in-
troduction abroad and explain the success of the U.S. copyright industries, the
criticisms of this model deserve policy reflection. To be sure, the highly polar-
ized nature of the copyright debate-both at home and abroad-has made it dif-
ficult for people on either side of the debate to listen to criticisms made by their
opponents.3 19 Nevertheless, a greater understanding of the weaknesses of the
U.S. fair use model will likely benefit not only those jurisdictions that seek to
import fair use, but also those that have already adopted fair use. After all, it is
no coincidence that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
described the fair use doctrine as "the most troublesome in the whole law of
copyright."320
Since the creation of the fair use doctrine in Folsom v. Marsh32 1 in the mid-
nineteenth century-or, more recently, the codification of this doctrine in the
312. See id. at 184 (discussing the emphasis on commercial interests in fair use cases).
313. See id. at 185 (discussing the focus on whether the original work is published).
314. See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1106 (2007) (discussing the soft fair
use rule concerning "reverse engineering of software through decompilation or disassembly of object code for
purposes of developing competing or complementary entertainment products or platforms").
315. See id at 1107 (discussing the soft fair use rule concerning whether "personal copying for purposes of
'time shifting' is fair").
316. See id. (discussing the "clarifying rule ... that commercial piracy-wholesale commercial duplication
of a copyrighted work for nonexpressive purposes-is not a fair use").
317. See sources cited supra note 22.
318. See Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants, supra note 17, at 7-8 (discussing the mixing of fair dealing
and fair use as a modality of transplantation).
319. See Yu, Confuzzling Rhetoric, supra note 122, at 292 ("The [current debate on digital copyright re-
form] is so polarized today that it is virtually impossible to find a proposal that all parties would accept, especially
when one takes into account the high social, economic and cultural stakes involved."); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual
Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 10 ("When [the two rival camps in the
intellectual property debate] argue, they often talk past each other, rather than to each other. At times, they even
accuse their rivals of being 'greedy,' doing 'evil,' or committing thefts and piracy." (footnotes omitted)).
320. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam).
321. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). For discussions of Folsom, see generally R. Anthony
Reese, The Story ofFolsom v. Marsh: Distinguishing Between Infringing andLegitimate Uses, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY STORIES 259 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss eds., 2006); L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v.
No. 1] 165
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
1976 Copyright Act32 2-many new legal, economic, and technological develop-
ments have taken place. As much as we trust the common law system to improve
the existing fair use model in the United States-such as by expanding the trans-
formative use doctrine323 or by extending the law to cover what Edward Lee has
coined "technological fair use"324-we also need to explore whether the U.S. fair
use regime should stay the same in the next round of copyright reform.
325
While there are certain benefits to retaining the flexibility of the present
regime, it is worth exploring whether that regime could become even better by
inserting additional statutory language to provide public guidance, such as
through the inclusion of a nonexhaustive list of illustrative purposes as the ALRC
proposed.32 6 It is also worth exploring whether a single fair use provision can
serve the copyright system better than having a few fair use provisions that cover
different types of fair uses. As Pamela Samuelson has shown, the transformative
use doctrine in U.S. copyright law has now evolved to cover three different types
of derivative uses: transformative uses, productive uses, and orthogonal uses.
327
Commentators such as Professor Samuelson and Michael Madison have also
noted how the use of clusters could help provide the fair use regime with more
clarity and predictability.32 8
3. Institutionalizing Hybrids
The final modality involves efforts to institutionalize hybrid models, either
as standardized rules or rulified standards. Because there are virtually unlimited
ways to develop institutional complements to facilitate these hybrid models,
329
Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431 (1998); Peter K. Yu, Tales of the Unintended in Copyright Law,
67 STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 1, 2-6 (2015).
322. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018) (codifying fair use).
323. See Samuelson, supra note 85, at 2548-58 (discussing the evolution of the transformative use doc-
trine).
324. See Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 806-07 (2010) (identifying the
successful technological fair use cases); see also U.S. GREEN PAPER, supra note 22, at 21 ("Fair use has been
applied by the courts to enable, among other things, the use of thumbnail images in Internet search results, cach-
ing of web pages by a search engine, and a digital plagiarism detection service." (footnotes omitted)); Matthew
Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1607,1610 (2009) (calling for the recognition
of a principle of nonexpressive use to resolve questions relating to copy-reliant technologies).
325. See sources cited supra note 22.
326. See ALRC FINALREPORT, supra note 18, at 150-51.
327. See Samuelson, supra note 85, at 2548-58 (discussing these different uses); see also Michael J. Mad-
ison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 397 (2005)
("Fair use has become too many things to too many people to be of much specific value to anyone."). Orthogonal
uses refer to "uses for a different purpose than the original." Samuelson, supra note 85, at 2545.
328. See generally Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1525 (2004) (advancing a pattern-oriented approach to fair use decisions); Samuelson, supra note 85 (ar-
guing that a focus on common patterns, or what Professor Samuelson called "policy-relevant clusters," will make
fair use law more coherent and predictable than many commentators have perceived).
329. There are other institution-based or -related proposals. See, e.g., Copyright Act, 5768-2007, § 19(c)
(2007) (Isr.). ("The Minister [of Justice] may make regulations prescribing conditions under which a use shall be
deemed a fair use."); CRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 94 (proposing an amendment hat allows the minister
to make regulations to "prescribe[e] what constitutes a fair use in particular cases"). As Joseph Liu observed:
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this Subsection illustrates with three institution-based proposals that have been
advanced in this area.
The first proposal concerns the establishment of a fair use board.330 As Mi-
chael Carroll, who advanced this proposal, explained:
Congress should extend the advisory opinion function available in other
bodies of federal law to copyright law by amending the Copyright Act to
create a Fair Use Board in the U.S. Copyright Office. Fair use judges would
have the authority and the obligation to consider petitions for a fair use
ruling on a contemplated or actual use of a copyrighted work. The copy-
right owner would receive notice of the petition and would have the oppor-
tunity to participate in the proceeding.
If the fair use judge determines that such a use is or would be a fair
use, the petitioner and the petitioner's heirs or assigns would be immune
from liability for copyright infringement for such use. Such a ruling would
not affect the copyright owner's rights and remedies with respect to any
other parties or any other uses of the copyrighted work by the petitioner. If
the judge rules that such use is not, or would not be, a fair use, the petitioner
retains all other defenses to copyright infringement. In either case, the
judge's determination would be administratively reviewable by the Regis-
ter of Copyrights. The Register's decisions would be reviewable de novo
in the federal circuit courts of appeals.33 1
The second proposal originated from Jason Mazzone.33 2 Utilizing an ad-
ministrative agency to enforce a federal fair use protection statute, this proposal
can be further broken down into two models of agency regulation. As Professor
Mazzone elaborated:
In the first model, an agency [known as the Office for Fair Use] is respon-
sible for generating regulations that determine what constitutes fair use in
specific contexts as well as preventing efforts to interfere with fair uses of
copyrighted works. In the second model, an agency [called the Copyright
Infringement Review Office] issues fair use regulations and determines
whether the use in question constitutes fair use prior to any copyright in-
fringement claim being brought in court.333
The final proposal concerned the role the Federal Trade Commission can
play in implementing user privileges in the digital world.334 As Gideon Par-
chomovsky and Philip Weiser, who advanced the proposal, explained, "the
Taking the regulatory approach [in copyright law] seriously suggests ... granting the Copyright Office or
some other agency greater rulemaking authority in order to flexibly adapt copyright law to changing cir-
cumstances; giving the Copyright Office sufficient resources and expertise to undertake this task; and en-
suring that the process is open to participation from a wide range of interests.
Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REv. 87, 140 (2004); see also Nimmer, supra note 85, at 12-15
(calling for the establishment of nonbinding fair use arbitration).
330. See Carroll, supra note 314, at 1122-43 (discussing this proposal).
331. Idat 1123.
332. See generally Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 395 (2009) (discuss-
ing this proposal).
333. Id at 399.
334. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 91, 126-36
(2010) (discussing this proposal).
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[Commission]-which has already begun to oversee and address deceptive and
unfair practices with regard to digital rights-management systems-is well
equipped to oversee such a regime."335 Compared with the proposal advanced by
Professor Carroll, both this proposal and Professor Mazzone's earlier proposal
called for an institutional setup that affects the rights of not only those individuals
or parties seeking to make fair use of a copyrighted work, but also all other indi-
vidual parties that could make an identical use.336
Taken together, these three proposals show how institutions can be utilized
to strengthen the combination of rules and standards in an effort to broaden cop-
yright limitations and exceptions. There is no doubt any proposal to create insti-
tutions will raise questions about the process, the budget, personnel, and other
administrative issues.3 37 Nevertheless, if the newly created institutions can help
strengthen existing proposals concerning rules, standards, or their combinations,
it would be worthwhile to study new institution-based proposals. Those pro-
posals seeking to co-opt existing institutions will be particularly promising. In
the examples listed in this Section, Professor Carroll's proposal utilized the U.S.
Copyright Office, 3 while Professors Parchomovsky and Weiser's proposal in-
volved the Federal Trade Commission.3 3 9
VI. CONCLUSION
In the past decade, jurisdictions from across the world have actively em-
braced efforts to modernize their copyright systems. Garnering considerable pol-
icy, scholarly, and popular attention is the introduction of fair use, which is based
on the paradigmatic U.S. model. Interestingly, as eager as these jurisdictions are
to introduce a more flexible set of copyright limitations and exceptions, many of
them made a conscious choice to introduce a hybrid model that introduces only
select aspects of the fair use model while retaining a considerable part of the
status quo.340
335. Id. at 97.
336. As Jason Mazzone noted:
[Professor Carroll's proposal] fall[s] short in that [it] provide[s] certainty only to the individual user who
goes through [the] Fair Use Board . ., and the certainty is only with respect to the particular use that is
reviewed. Other users will not know whether their uses are fair use unless they, too, go through the process.
Certainty on a large scale is therefore impossible.
Mazzone, supra note 332, at 432.
337. See Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention andAnti-anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 13, 68-69 (2006)
(discussing the challenges of establishing a process that would bring together copyright holders, technology de-
velopers, consumer advocates, civil libertarians, and other stakeholders in the copyright system).
338. See Carroll, supra note 314, at 1123 (creating the proposed Fair Use Board in the U.S. Copyright
Office).
339. See Parchomovsky & Weiser, supra note 334, at 126-36 (discussing the role of the Federal Trade
Commission in their proposal).
340. Compare discussion supra Section III.A (documenting efforts to reform the copyright system and to
introduce fair use proposals), with discussion supra Section HI.B (showing a lack of a paradigm shift injurisdic-
tions that ended up adopting a hybrid model despite introducing or considering fair use proposals).
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This Article calls on policy-makers, legislators, and commentators to pay
greater attention to those largely under-analyzed hybrid models34 1 and how they
have reflected the ongoing evolution of the fair use paradigm. A better under-
standing of these hybrid models will not only help us develop greater apprecia-
tion for copyright reform but will also enable us to reexamine our existing cop-
yright system and thereby explore whether and how that system can be further
modernized. At a broader level, such analysis will further help us develop better
insights into global law reform that is based on paradigmatic U.S. models.
341. Some commentators are keenly aware of these models. As Michael Carroll observed:
A different approach to improving ex ante certainty would be to amend the Copyright Act to create a list of
privileged uses or, less forcefully, to create a list of presumptively fair uses or safe harbors. Versions of this
approach have been taken through the narrow privilege of "fair dealing" recognized in commonwealth
countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.
Carroll, supra note 314, at 1147 (2007) (footnotes omitted). Seagull Song also noted that a third model of fair
use or fair dealing exists in the form of
a combination of the U.S. and U.K. models found in the Taiwanese Copyright Act and the recently revised
South Korean Copyright Act, which offer both an enumerated list of permissible uses (as with the United
Kingdom) and a number of factors to be considered in determining whether the particular use is fair (as
with the United States).
Seagull Haiyan Song, Revaluating Fair Use in China-A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Chinese Fair Use
Legislation, the US. Fair Use Doctrine, and the European Fair Use Dealing Model, 51 IDEA 453, 454-55
(2011) (footnotes omitted).
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